巴菲特35年的投資智慧(35 Years of Buffett's Greatest Investing Wisdom)

最近有一些小忙,所以先幫Makssin讀友整理一下由motley fool整理的巴菲特近35年的投資智慧,如果翻譯不好請見諒ㄋ..哈哈...

1977: "Most companies define 'record' earnings as a new high in earnings per share. Since businesses customarily add from year to year to their equity base, we find nothing particularly noteworthy in a management performance combining, say, a 10% increase in equity capital and a 5% increase in earnings per share. After all, even a totally dormant savings account will produce steadily rising interest earnings each year because of compounding. ... we believe a more appropriate measure of managerial economic performance to be return on equity capital."

大部分的公司會宣稱EPS創新高,這沒蝦咪新奇的,例如股本擴充10%,和EPS 5% 的成長,因為光是靜止不動的定存戶由於複利的效果就會有這結果,所以股東權益報酬率才是測量企業的工具..
(簡單的說:ROE比EPS更適合做公司的評估)

1978: "We make no attempt to predict how security markets will behave; successfully forecasting short term stock price movements is something we think neither we nor anyone else can do."

我們不會想要預測股票市場的下一步,也不認為誰能預測短期股票市場的走勢
(簡單的說:別相信任何預測股票市場之說)

1979: "Both our operating and investment experience cause us to conclude that "turnarounds" seldom turn, and that the same energies and talent are much better employed in a good business purchased at a fair price than in a poor business purchased at a bargain price."

從我們的投資經驗來說,轉機很難發生,還不如用公道的價格去購買好的企業,這勝過你用便宜價格去買普通的企業..
(簡單的說:寧願用稍高價格買好公司,也不要用便宜價格買爛公司)

1980: "[O]nly gains in purchasing power represent real earnings on investment. If you (a) forgo ten hamburgers to purchase an investment; (b) receive dividends which, after tax, buy two hamburgers; and (c) receive, upon sale of your holdings, after-tax proceeds that will buy eight hamburgers, then (d) you have had no real income from your investment, no matter how much it appreciated in dollars."

購買力才能算是真正的投資獲利,假如你放棄了去買10個漢堡而去投資,然後你收到了兩個股利,這些股利可以買兩個漢堡,最後你賣出持股卻只能買八個漢堡,實際上投資這是沒有收入的.
(簡單的說:購買力才是衡量最後的投資成果)

1981: "While market values track business values quite well over long periods, in any given year the relationship can gyrate capriciously."

股價會追隨企業的價值很長一段時間,但在麼一年,它可能反覆無常.
(簡單的說:短期公司價值跟股價可能沒關係,長期來說會走向一至)

1982: "The market, like the Lord, helps those who help themselves. But, unlike the Lord, the market does not forgive those who know not what they do. For the investor, a too-high purchase price for the stock of an excellent company can undo the effects of a subsequent decade of favorable business developments."

如果一個投資人付出太高的價格去購買一家優秀企業,就算未來公司發展得不錯時,投資人也不會獲得蝦咪
(簡單的說:用高價位買好公司是糟糕的)

1983: "We will be candid in our reporting to you, emphasizing the pluses and minuses important in appraising business value. Our guideline is to tell you the business facts that we would want to know if our positions were reversed. ... We also believe candor benefits us as managers: the CEO who misleads others in public may eventually mislead himself in private."

我們將會坦率告訴妳們,基於評估商業價值的長短處,畢竟如果妳們處在我的位置上也會想知道這些事實....我們相信坦率的好處,因為對CEO來說企圖誤導人將被自己所誤導...
(簡單的說:要坦率)

1984: "[M]ajor repurchases at prices well below per-share intrinsic business value immediately increase, in a highly significant way, that value. ... Corporate acquisition programs almost never do as well and, in a discouragingly large number of cases, fail to get anything close to $1 of value for each $1 expended."

透過回購股票,企業的每股實質價值將會提升,這比你去併購企業更有價值
(簡單的說:在一些情形,要買自家股票能提升價值)

1985: "[A] good managerial record ... is far more a function of what business boat you get into than it is of how effectively you row ... Should you find yourself in a chronically leaking boat, energy devoted to changing vessels is likely to be more productive than energy devoted to patching leaks."

擁有管理良好的紀錄是重要的 -- 重點不是你能讓船划的多快,而是船本身是否良好,與其在花精力在修補長期漏洞的船,還不如直接換一條船還省些精力..
(簡單的說:不要花時間在爛公司上)

1986: "We intend to continue our practice of working only with people whom we like and admire. ... On the other hand, working with people who cause your stomach to churn seems much like marrying for money -- probably a bad idea under any circumstances, but absolute madness if you are already rich."

我們喜歡跟那些我們喜歡和欣賞的人一起工作,和那些不喜歡的人一起工作就像為錢而結婚一樣,這絕對是很差的想法,特別是如果你還很有錢的話..
(簡單的說:和喜歡的人一起工作)

1987: "The value of market esoterica to the consumer of investment advice is a different story. In my opinion, investment success will not be produced by arcane formulae, computer programs or signals flashed by the price behavior of stocks and markets. Rather an investor will succeed by coupling good business judgment with an ability to insulate his thoughts and behavior from the super-contagious emotions that swirl about the marketplace."

股市獲勝的祕訣對投資人有相當的吸引力,就我的意見來看,成功的投資沒有不是由公式,程式或是股價在股市波動所造成的.而是投資人對商業的判斷與避免被市場情緒影響的能力
(簡單的說:投資只做商業判斷,同時避免受情緒影響)

1988: "To evaluate arbitrage situations you must answer four questions: (1) How likely is it that the promised event will indeed occur? (2) How long will your money be tied up? (3) What chance is there that something still better will transpire -- a competing takeover bid, for example? and (4) What will happen if the event does not take place because of antitrust action, financing glitches, etc.?"

要評估套利有4個問題要問1.這發生的機率有多少ㄋ??2資金會被套多久ㄋ,3是否有那種併購競價的好事情發生ㄋ??4如果反托拉斯法或是財務狀況讓事情沒發生的話會如何ㄋ??

1989: "Because of the way the tax law works, the Rip Van Winkle style of investing that we favor -- if successful -- has an important mathematical edge over a more frenzied approach."

因為稅法的運作,我們喜歡李伯大夢式的投資方式(買了就不管它),因為她這方式本身就有數學上的優勢,不會被頻繁交易課稅
(簡單的說:長期投資可以避免被課稅)

1990: "Because leverage of 20:1 magnifies the effects of managerial strengths and weaknesses, we have no interest in purchasing shares of a poorly managed bank at a 'cheap' price. Instead, our only interest is in buying into well-managed banks at fair prices." (He wrote this in reference to Berkshire's purchase of Wells Fargo (NYS: WFC) , a bank he continues to laud today).

因為20:1的槓桿會放大長處跟短處,我們沒有興趣用便宜的價格去購買那些經營不善的銀行,反之我們願意用公平的價格去購買良好的企業,如富國銀行..
(簡單的說:槓桿會讓購買差的銀行顯得相當危險)

1991: " An economic franchise arises from a product or service that: (1) is needed or desired; (2) is thought by its customers to have no close substitute and; (3) is not subject to price regulation."

商品或是服務的專營權住要有三項,一是需要和渴望,二是無替代商品,三是沒受價格管制的

1992: "[W]e think the very term 'value investing' is redundant. What is 'investing' if it is not the act of seeking value at least sufficient to justify the amount paid? Consciously paying more for a stock than its calculated value -- in the hope that it can soon be sold for a still-higher price -- should be labeled speculation (which is neither illegal, immoral nor -- in our view -- financially fattening)."

我們認為價值投資這名詞是多餘的, 投資不就是尋找價值並支付相當的價格??一直付比價值更高的價位,這應該算是投機,但這也沒犯法,也不算沒道德,也沒有財務灌水..
(簡單的說:投資就是買低於價值賣高於價值)

1993: "The worst of these [arguments for selling a stock] is perhaps, 'You can't go broke taking a profit.' Can you imagine a CEO using this line to urge his board to sell a star subsidiary?"

最糟的一句話莫過於你不會因為股票獲利了結而破產,但你能想像一個CEO用這方式賣出一個明星企業嗎??
(簡單的說:只因為想獲利了結而賣出一家好公司是笨蛋)

1994: "We will continue to ignore political and economic forecasts, which are an expensive distraction for many investors and businessmen. ... Indeed, we have usually made our best purchases when apprehensions about some macro event were at a peak. Fear is the foe of the faddist, but the friend of the fundamentalist."

我們持續忽略政治很經濟的預測,對投資人來說這些太昂貴而無用....我們通常是在大環境最差的頂峰大家恐謊時去購買股票,恐慌是趕流行投資人的敵人,卻是基本面投資人的好朋友..
(簡單的說:忽略預測,避免恐慌)

1995: "Any company's level of profitability is determined by three items: (1) what its assets earn; (2) what its liabilities cost; and (3) its utilization of 'leverage' -- that is, the degree to which its assets are funded by liabilities rather than by equity."

公司獲利的程度主要由三項所決定,第一是運用資產的獲利,第二是負債成本多寡,第三是槓桿的使用是 -- 也就是說,利用負債來取得資產的程度,而不是用股東權益

1996: "In the end, however, no sensible observer -- not even these companies' most vigorous competitors, assuming they are assessing the matter honestly -- questions that [Coca-Cola (NYS: KO) ] and Gillette will dominate their fields worldwide for an investment lifetime." (A decade and a half later, and he's yet to be proven wrong, though Gillette is now dominating as a Procter & Gamble (NYS: PG) subsidiary, making Berkshire P&G's fourth-biggest shareholder and Coke's largest.)

沒有明智的觀察家會質疑可口可樂和吉列會主宰各自領域在很長的一段投資週期,如10年或是5年之後.波克夏擁有1/4Ｐ＆Ｇ股權,同時也是可口可樂的最大股東,這決策它還依舊是對的

1997: "Only those who will be sellers of equities in the near future should be happy at seeing stocks rise. Prospective purchasers should much prefer sinking prices."

除非那些已經買入股票的人對於股票上漲應該高興以外,投資人應該喜歡在低價位買股.
(簡單的說:投資人應該要喜歡低價買股票)

1998: "We give each [of our company managers] a simple mission: Just run your business as if: 1) you own 100% of it; 2) it is the only asset in the world that you and your family have or will ever have; and 3) you can't sell or merge it for at least a century. As a corollary, we tell them they should not let any of their decisions be affected even slightly by accounting considerations. We want our managers to think about what counts, not how it will be counted."

我們給我們的經理一個簡單任務,大家只需要照自已的方式去做事業就是了,不論你是100%的持有,或是它是妳和妳家人資產的一部分,或即是他是不可被賣出併購一世紀.他們的決定能夠被會計計算影響一些,我希望我們的經理想該如何計算,而不是它們會被哪種方式如何計算ㄋ
(簡單的說:不管會計如何計算,公司價值不會改變)

1999: "Our lack of tech insights, we should add, does not distress us. After all, there are a great many business areas in which Charlie and I have no special capital-allocation expertise. For instance, we bring nothing to the table when it comes to evaluating patents, manufacturing processes or geological prospects. So we simply don't get into judgments in those fields."

我們沒有科技見解,但這不會困擾我們,畢竟還是有很多商業領域對孟格跟我來說不是專家.換句話說,我們不會評估專利,製成,或是地質的前景.但我們不會跳到這些領域去判斷...
(簡單的說:投資你了解的東西)

2000: "But a pin lies in wait for every bubble. And when the two eventually meet, a new wave of investors learns some very old lessons: First, many in Wall Street -- a community in which quality control is not prized -- will sell investors anything they will buy. Second, speculation is most dangerous when it looks easiest."

一根針總是在等待搓破投資泡沫,投資人學到古老的教訓,首先,在華爾街,一些利益團體會賣出任何投資人想買的商品,不論這些品質的好壞.第二是,投機看起來很簡單時卻是最危險的時候
(簡單的說:大多頭泡沫時請小心)

2001: "Some people disagree with our focus on relative figures, arguing that 'you can't eat relative performance.' But if you expect as Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman, and I do -- that owning the S&P 500 will produce reasonably satisfactory results over time, it follows that, for long-term investors, gaining small advantages annually over that index must prove rewarding."

有些人不同意我們聚焦在相對數字的方法,說相對數字不能吃.但如果你期待夢格和我本人,投資人會人高興的,如果經年累月來我們總是比S&P500績效好一些

2002: "Many people argue that derivatives reduce systemic problems, in that participants who can't bear certain risks are able to transfer them to stronger hands. These people believe that derivatives act to stabilize the economy, facilitate trade, and eliminate bumps for individual participants. And, on a micro level, what they say is often true. ..."Charlie and I believe, however, that the macro picture is dangerous and getting more so. Large amounts of risk, particularly credit risk, have become concentrated in the hands of relatively few derivatives dealers, who in addition trade extensively with one other. The troubles of one could quickly infect the others. On top of that, these dealers are owed huge amounts by non-dealer counterparties. Some of these counterparties, as I've mentioned, are linked in ways that could cause them to contemporaneously run into a problem because of a single event (such as the implosion of the telecom industry or the precipitous decline in the value of merchant power projects). Linkage, when it suddenly surfaces, can trigger serious systemic problems."

很多人爭論衍生性金融商品可以減少系統性風險,因為當參予者沒辦法承受風險時,它們可以轉嫁給其他較強的人身上,這些人相信在微觀層面,衍生信金融商品可以穩定經濟,活絡貿易,消除波動,事實上他們說的是對的......孟格和我相信,以巨觀層面去看這是危險的,擁有相當大的風險,特別是信貸風險,已經集中在相對少數人的交易商裡,而這些交易商互相交易相當頻繁.以至於當一個出問題時,很快的就會影響到另一個.在這基礎上,交易商擁有巨額的非交易商款項,一旦出現單一事件時,會同時出現問題(如同電信業的崩潰或是民營電力業的價值減損).他們最終產生了系統性的風險
(簡單的說:衍生性金融商品有系統性風險)

2003: "True independence -- meaning the willingness to challenge a forceful CEO when something is wrong or foolish -- is an enormously valuable trait in a director. It is also rare. The place to look for it is among high-grade people whose interests are in line with those of rank-and-file shareholders -- and are in line in a very big way."

獨立意味著,當CEO做錯事時,它願意去挑戰它,這對董事來說是一項非常有價值的特質.當然要找到擁有高品質的人,並且它的利益還與股東利益佔在同一線是相當的不容易..
(簡單的說:要讓CEO跟董事會獨立相當不容易)

2004: "Over the 35 years [ending in 2004], American business has delivered terrific results. It should therefore have been easy for investors to earn juicy returns... Instead many investors have had experiences ranging from mediocre to disastrous."There have been three primary causes: first, high costs, usually because investors traded excessively or spent far too much on investment management; second, portfolio decisions based on tips and fads rather than on thoughtful, quantified evaluation of businesses; and third, a start-and-stop approach to the market marked by untimely entries (after an advance has been long under way) and exits (after periods of stagnation or decline). Investors should remember that excitement and expenses are their enemies. And if they insist on trying to time their participation in equities, they should try to be fearful when others are greedy and greedy only when others are fearful."

過去35五年來(直到2004年),美國的經濟獲得豐碩的成果,照常理來說,投資人也應該獲得不錯的成果,取而代之的是平庸甚至時災難.主要有三種原因造成這投資結果,由於頻繁交易或是額外過多的投資管理費用造成了投資的高費用.第二ˋ是投資依靠的是秘訣,流行而非思想周到,或是量化的商業評估,第三則是在上漲很多時泡去購買股票,當下跌很多或是委靡不振時殺出股票.投資人應該要記得的是興奮跟費用是你的敵人,投資人應該要試著在別人貪婪時恐懼,在別人恐懼時貪婪..
(簡單的說:手續費,管理費會侵蝕你的投資成果)

2005: "[For CEOs] huge severance payments, lavish perks and outsized payments for ho-hum performance often occur because comp committees have become slaves to comparative data. The drill is simple: Three or so directors -- not chosen by chance -- are bombarded for a few hours before a board meeting with pay statistics that perpetually ratchet upwards. Additionally, the committee is told about new perks that other managers are receiving. In this manner, outlandish "goodies" are showered upon CEOs simply because of a corporate version of the argument we all used when children: 'But, Mom, all the other kids have one.' "

當委員會變成和CEO走在同一條路時,CEO巨大的遣散費,豐厚的福利和對普通績效過多的支付通常都會發生.這戲碼相當簡單,通常是3個或是叫董事(故意選的)經過幾小時的討論,最後得到了福利要一直往上調,除此之外委員會還會討論其它的福利,原因只是因為其他公司也有..
(簡單的說:董事跟CEO利益通常是一致的)

2006: "Corporate bigwigs often complain about government spending, criticizing bureaucrats who they say spend taxpayers' money differently from how they would if it were their own. But sometimes the financial behavior of executives will also vary based on whose wallet is getting depleted. Here's an illustrative tale from my days at Salomon. In the 1980s the company had a barber, Jimmy by name, who came in weekly to give free haircuts to the top brass. A manicurist was also on tap. Then, because of a cost-cutting drive, patrons were told to pay their own way. One top executive (not the CEO) who had previously visited Jimmy weekly went immediately to a once-every-three-weeks schedule."

公司高管通常抱怨政府開支和批評管僚,說他們花納稅人的錢好像不是自己的錢一樣,但其是有時那些高管的行為也是會如此,例如在1980年代,一個公司有一個理髮師叫Jimmy,他每一周幫高管檢一次頭髮,當公司要減預算要叫它們自行付剪髮費用時,他們可能就馬上變成三周來剪髮一次..
(簡單的說:高管通常只會圖利自己)

2007: "A truly great business must have an enduring 'moat' that protects excellent returns on invested capital. The dynamics of capitalism guarantee that competitors will repeatedly assault any business 'castle' that is earning high returns. Therefore a formidable barrier such as a company's being the lowcost producer (GEICO, [Costco]) or possessing a powerful worldwide brand (Coca-Cola, Gillette, [American Express]) is essential for sustained success."

一個偉大的商業哦是必須要有一個護城河來保護它的投資報酬.資本主義的現況會讓競爭者不斷的攻擊這些獲利豐厚的堡壘.因此,對於長久成功不可或缺的強大障礙是必要的,諸如低成本的GEICO,COSTCO或是全球知名的Coca-Cola ,Gilette,American Express
(簡單的說:要有投資護城河,企業才能保護投資報酬)

2008: (Recall that the financial crisis was raging) "Amid this bad news, however, never forget that our country has faced far worse travails in the past. In the 20th Century alone, we dealt with two great wars (one of which we initially appeared to be losing); a dozen or so panics and recessions; virulent inflation that led to a 21 1⁄2% prime rate in 1980; and the Great Depression of the 1930s, when unemployment ranged between 15% and 25% for many years. America has had no shortage of challenges."Without fail, however, we've overcome them. In the face of those obstacles -- and many others -- the real standard of living for Americans improved nearly seven-fold during the 1900s, while the Dow Jones Industrials rose from 66 to 11,497."

回顧金融危機伺聶,面對這些壞消息,別忘了我門國家在過去所面對的災難,單單在20世紀.我們就面對兩個戰爭(一個我們可能一開始就輸了).很多的恐慌與衰退,通膨導致基本利率在1980年為21 1⁄2%;還有1930年代的大蕭條,讓失業率持續在15%到25%之間很多年.美國不缺那些挑戰,事實上我們戰勝了這些障礙,美國人的生活水平成長了將近7倍在1990年代,Dow-Jones工業指數從66漲當了11479點..
(簡單的說:在投資時,別害怕經濟災難)

2009: "We've put a lot of money to work during the chaos of the last two years. It's been an ideal period for investors: A climate of fear is their best friend. Those who invest only when commentators are upbeat end up paying a heavy price for meaningless reassurance. In the end, what counts in investing is what you pay for a business -- through the purchase of a small piece of it in the stock market -- and what that business earns in the succeeding decade or two."

過去兩年我們利用股市的混亂投資了很多錢,這對投資人來說是一個好的投資時刻,因為恐懼的氣氛是投資的好朋友.那些依照評論員做樂觀預期而去買股票的投資人,到頭來他們會買到高價.股市,最終來說,買股票就是買企業,
(簡單的說:要利用恐慌來賺錢)

2010: "Money will always flow toward opportunity, and there is an abundance of that in America. Commentators today often talk of 'great uncertainty.' But think back, for example, to December 6, 1941, October 18, 1987 and September 10, 2001. No matter how serene today may be, tomorrow is always uncertain."

金錢總是朝著有利可圖的方向走,未來的不確定總是被評論員說得一而再,再而三,但回顧以前,1941年的12月,1987年的10月,2001年的9月,在這些恐慌的日子理,未來是多麼的不確定,更何況今天是無風無雨的日子,可以確定的是未來依舊不確定..
(簡單的說:未來是不確定的)

2011: "The logic is simple: If you are going to be a net buyer of stocks in the future, either directly with your own money or indirectly (through your ownership of a company that is repurchasing shares), you are hurt when stocks rise. You benefit when stocks swoon. Emotions, however, too often complicate the matter: Most people, including those who will be net buyers in the future, take comfort in seeing stock prices advance."

邏輯相當簡單:當股價上漲時,不論你要當個買股的人或是透過擁有一家回購股票的公司,你將會受傷,反之,當股價低迷時,你當個股票買家就會有利可圖.這原因是因為情緒會讓事情變得複雜,大部分投資人喜歡那些正在上漲的股票,因為這樣讓他覺得舒服...
(簡單的說:別因為股價上漲才讓你安心去買股票)

By Matt Koppenheffer, The Motley Fool