2012年8月25日

Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders (巴菲特寫給股東的信,1981年)

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致Berkshire公司全體股東:

Operating earnings of $39.7 million in 1981 amounted to 15.2% ofbeginning equity capital (valuing securities at cost) compared to 17.8% in 1980. Our new plan that allows stockholders to designate corporate charitable contributions (detailed later) reduced earnings by about $ 900,000 in 1981. This program, which we expect to continue subject to annual evaluation of our corporate tax position, had not been initiated in 1980.

1981年的營業利益約為3,970萬美元,期初股東權益報酬率(持有股權投資以原始成本計)從去年的17.8%滑落至15.2%。我們的新計劃是讓所有股東皆能指定捐贈的慈善機構,(詳如後述) ,這使得當年度盈餘減少90萬美元,往後將視我們公司所得稅負狀況決定捐贈的金額。

Non-Controlled Ownership Earnings
無控制權持股之盈餘

In the 1980 annual report we discussed extensively the concept of non-controlled ownership earnings, i.e., Berkshire ’s share of theundistributed earnings of companies we don’t control or significantly
influence but in which we, nevertheless, have important investments. (We will be glad to make available to new or prospective shareholders copies of that discussion or others from earlier reports to which we refer in this report.) No portion of those undistributed earnings is included in the operating earnings of Berkshire .

去年我們曾詳細地討論無控制權持股盈餘的觀念,亦即那些我們無法控制或影響其盈餘分配的一些重要的被投資公司(我們很樂意與新股東或潛在股東討論這項話題),而這部份的盈餘卻又完全未顯現在Berkshire的帳面之上。

However, our belief is that, in aggregate, those undistributed and,therefore, unrecorded earnings will be translated into tangible value for Berkshire shareholders just as surely as if subsidiaries we control had earned, retained - and reported - similar earnings.

然而,我們深信這些未分配且未被記錄的盈餘,仍將終與那些我們控制的公司所賺的盈餘一樣轉化成Berkshire實質的價值。

We know that this translation of non-controlled ownership earningsinto corresponding realized and unrealized capital gains for Berkshire will be extremely irregular as to time of occurrence. While market values track business values quite well over long periods, in any given year the relationship can gyrate capriciously. Market recognition of retained earnings also will be unevenly realized among companies. It will be disappointingly low or negative in cases where earnings are employed non-productively, and far greater than dollar-for-dollar of retained earnings in cases of companies that achieve high returns with their augmented capital. Overall, if a group of non-controlled companies is selected with reasonable skill, the group result should be quite satisfactory.

雖然我們明瞭這些不具控制權的盈餘轉化為Berkshire已實現或未實現利得的時間點很難拿捏,但就長期而言,市場價格或許變動不一,卻終將會與企業價值同步發展,甚至不同的公司也會有不同的情況,一家將盈餘運用得當與運用不當的公司,也會有不一樣的結局,總而言之,只要經過合理的挑選,一群不具控制權的投資也會產生令人意想不到的效果。

In aggregate, our non-controlled business interests have more favorable underlying economic characteristics than our controlled businesses. That’s understandable; the area of choice has been far wider. Small portions of exceptionally good businesses are usually available in the securities markets at reasonable prices. But such businesses are available for purchase in their entirety only rarely, and then almost always at high prices.

就整體而言,我們這些不具控制權的被投資公司,其企業競爭力反而比那些具控制權的公司來得佳,可能的原因是因為在股票市場上我們可以合理的價格買到部份優秀企業的股權,而若要透過購併談判的方式買下整家公司,其平均價格可能遠高於市價。General Acquisition Behavior
企業購併行為常態

As our history indicates, we are comfortable both with total ownership of businesses and with marketable securities representing small portions of businesses. We continually look for ways to employ large sums in each area. (But we try to avoid small commitments - “If something’s not worth doing at all, it’s not worth doing well”.) Indeed, the liquidity requirements of our insurance and trading stamp businesses mandate major investments in
marketable securities.

經驗顯示,我們對於擁有整家公司或僅持有部份股權,並無特殊偏好,目前我們仍持續投資大筆資金在兩者之上(我們儘量避免小額投資,因為一件事若一點也不值得去作,那麼就算把它作得再好也沒有用),而事實上,由於經營保險公司與禮券事業都必須保持適當的流動性,所以我們本來就必須將資金大量投入於有價證券。

Our acquisition decisions will be aimed at maximizing real economic benefits, not at maximizing either managerial domain or reported numbers for accounting purposes. (In the long run, managements stressing accounting appearance over economic substance usually achieve little of either.)

我們購併的決策著重於讓實質的經濟利益而非企業版圖或會計數字極大化,(就長期而言,若管理當局過度注重會計數字而忽略經濟實質的話,最後通常兩者都顧不好)。

Regardless of the impact upon immediately reportable earnings, wewould rather buy 10% of Wonderful Business T at X per share than 100% of T at 2X per share. Most corporate managers prefer just the reverse, and have no shortage of stated rationales for their behavior.

不管對短期的帳面盈餘有何影響,我們寧願以X 價格買下一家好公司10%的股權,也不要以2X 價格買下這家好公司100%的股權,但大部份公司經營階層的選擇剛好相反,而且對這樣的行為總是能找到藉口。

However, we suspect three motivations - usually unspoken - to be,singly or in combination, the important ones in most high-premiumtakeovers:

對於這樣的行為,我們可以歸納出三大動機(通常是心照不宣):

(1) Leaders, business or otherwise, seldom are deficient in animal spirits and often relish increased activity and challenge. At Berkshire , the corporate pulse never beats faster than when an acquisition is in prospect.

(1)領導階層幾乎很少人是缺乏動物天性的,且時時散發出過動與戰鬥的意念。相對地在Berkshire,即使是購併成功在望,其管理當局的心跳也不會加快一下。

(2) Most organizations, business or otherwise, measure themselves,are measured by others, and compensate their managers far more by the yardstick of size than by any other yardstick. (Ask a Fortune 500 manager where his corporation stands on that famous list and, invariably, the number responded will be from the list ranked by size of sales; he may well not even know where his corporation places on the list Fortune just as faithfully compiles ranking the same 500 corporations by profitability.)

(2)大部份的公司及其經營階層,多以「規模」而非「獲利」,作為衡量自己或他人的標準(問問那些名列Fortune 500 大企業的負責人,他們可能從來都不知道自己的公司若以獲利能力來排的話,會落在第幾位)

(3) Many managements apparently were overexposed in impressionable childhood years to the story in which the imprisoned handsome prince is released from a toad’s body by a kiss from a beautiful princess. Consequently, they are certain their managerial kiss will do wonders for the profitability of Company T(arget).

(3)許多經營階層很明顯地過度沉浸於小時候所聽到的,一個變成蟾蜍的王子因美麗的公主深深一吻而獲救的童話故事,而一廂情願地認為只要被他們優異的管理能力一吻,被購併的公司便能脫胎換骨。

Such optimism is essential. Absent that rosy view, why else should the shareholders of Company A(cquisitor) want to own an interest in T at the 2X takeover cost rather than at the X market price they would pay if they made direct purchases on their own?

如此樂觀的態度確有其必要,否則公司的股東怎麼會甘願以二倍的價錢買下這家公司,而不是用一倍的價格自己從市場上買進。

In other words, investors can always buy toads at the going price for toads. If investors instead bankroll princesses who wish to pay double for the right to kiss the toad, those kisses had better pack some real dynamite. We’ve observed many kisses but very few miracles. Nevertheless, many managerial princesses remain serenely confident about the future potency of their kisses - even after their corporate backyards are knee-deep in unresponsive toads.

換言之,投資人永遠可以以蟾蜍的價格買到蟾蜍,但若投資人願意用雙倍的代價資助公主去親吻蟾蜍的話,最好保佑奇蹟會發生,許多公主依然堅信她們的吻有使蟾蜍變成王子的魔力,即使在她的後院早已養滿了一大堆的蟾蜍。

In fairness, we should acknowledge that some acquisition records have been dazzling. Two major categories stand out.

儘管如此,平心而論仍然有兩種情況的購併是會成功的:

The first involves companies that, through design or accident, havepurchased only businesses that are particularly well adapted to aninflationary environment. Such favored business must have two
characteristics: (1) an ability to increase prices rather easily (even when product demand is flat and capacity is not fully utilized) without fear of significant loss of either market share or unit volume, and (2) an ability to accommodate large dollar volume increases in business (often produced more by inflation than by real growth) with only minor additional investment of capital. Managers of ordinary ability, focusing solely on acquisition possibilities meeting these tests, have achieved excellent results
in recent decades. However, very few enterprises possess bothcharacteristics, and competition to buy those that do has now become fierce to the point of being self-defeating.

第一類是你買到的(不管是有意或無意的)是那種特別能夠適應通貨膨脹的公司,通常它們又具備了兩種特徵,一是很容易去調漲價格 (即使是當產品需求平緩而產能未充份利用也一樣)且不怕會失去市場佔有率或銷售量;一是只要增加額外少量的資本支出,便可以使營業額大幅增加(雖然增加的原因大部份是因為通貨膨脹而非實際增加產出的緣故),近十幾年來,只要符合以上兩種條件,雖然這種情況不多,即使是能力普通的經理人也能使這樣的購併案圓滿成功。

The second category involves the managerial superstars - men whocan recognize that rare prince who is disguised as a toad, and who have managerial abilities that enable them to peel away the disguise. We salute such managers as Ben Heineman at Northwest Industries, Henry Singleton at Teledyne, Erwin Zaban at National Service Industries, and especially Tom Murphy at Capital Cities Communications (a real managerial “twofer”, whoseacquisition efforts have been properly focused in Category 1 and whose operating talents also make him a leader of Category 2). From both direct and vicarious experience, we recognize the difficulty and rarity of these executives’ achievements. (So do they; these champs have made very few deals in recent years, and often have found repurchase of their own shares to be the most sensible employment of corporate capital.)

(2)第二類是那些經營奇才,他們具有洞悉少數裹著蟾蜍外衣的王子,並且有能力讓它們脫去偽裝,我們尤其要向Capital City 的Tom Murphy致敬,他是那種能將購併目標鎖定在第一類的公司,而本身具有的管理長才又使他成為第二類的佼佼者。直接或間接的經驗使我們深深體認,要達到像他們那樣成就的困難性(當然也因為如此,近幾年來真正成功的個案並不多,且會發現到頭來利用公司資金買回自家股份是最實在的方法)。

Your Chairman, unfortunately, does not qualify for Category 2. And,despite a reasonably good understanding of the economic factorscompelling concentration in Category 1, our actual acquisition activity in that category has been sporadic and inadequate. Our preaching was better than our performance. (We neglected the Noah principle: predicting rain doesn’t count, building arks does.)

而很不幸的,你們的董事長並不屬於第二類的人,且儘管已充份體認到須將重點擺在第一類的公司,但真正命中的機率卻又少之又少,我們講得比作得好聽(我們忘了諾亞的叮嚀:能預測什麼時候下大雨沒有用,必須要能建造方舟才算。)

We have tried occasionally to buy toads at bargain prices with resultsthat have been chronicled in past reports. Clearly our kisses fell flat. We have done well with a couple of princes - but they were princes when purchased. At least our kisses didn’t turn them into toads. And, finally, we have occasionally been quite successful in purchasing fractional interests in easily-identifiable princes at toad-like prices.

我們曾以划算的價錢買下不少蟾蜍,過去的報告多已提及,很明顯的我們的吻表現平平,我們也遇到幾個王子級的公司,但是早在我們買下時他們就已是王子了,當然至少我們的吻沒讓他們變回蟾蜍,而最後我們偶爾也曾成功地以蟾蜍般的價格買到部份王子級公司的股票。

Berkshire Acquisition Objectives
Berkshire的購併目標

We will continue to seek the acquisition of businesses in their entirety at prices that will make sense, even should the future of the acquired enterprise develop much along the lines of its past. We may very well pay a fairly fancy price for a Category 1 business if we are reasonably confident of what we are getting. But we will not normally pay a lot in any purchase for what we are supposed to bring to the party - for we find that we ordinarily don’t bring a lot.

我們將持續以合理的價錢買下整家公司,即使那家公司未來的發展與過去一般;我們也願意以較高的價錢買下第一類的公司,前提是我們可以合理的相信他們就是那樣的公司;但我們通常不會去買那些我們必須替其作許多改變的公司,因為經驗顯示我們所作的改變不見得是好的。

During 1981 we came quite close to a major purchase involving both a business and a manager we liked very much. However, the price finally demanded, considering alternative uses for the funds involved, would have left our owners worse off than before the purchase. The empire would have been larger, but the citizenry would have been poorer.

今年(1981年)我們幾乎談成一筆大買賣,那家公司與其經營階層都是我們所喜愛的,但就是價錢談不隴,若堅持買下的結果,股東的利益不見得會比買之前更好,整個Berkshire帝國版圖可能會變的更大,但人民素質反而會變差。

Although we had no success in 1981, from time to time in the futurewe will be able to purchase 100% of businesses meeting our standards. Additionally, we expect an occasional offering of a major “non-voting partnership” as discussed under the Pinkerton’s heading on page 47 of this report. We welcome suggestions regarding such companies where we, as a substantial junior partner, can achieve good economic results while furthering the long-term objectives of present owners and managers.

儘管1981年我們並沒有成功地談成任何一個個案,但我們預計未來仍能買到100% 符合我們標準的公司,此外我們也期望能有像後面報告所述Pinkerton這樣投資大量不具投票權股權的例子,在身為次要大股東的我們可獲得可觀的經濟利益的同時,亦能幫助公司原有的經營階層實現其長期的目標。

Currently, we find values most easily obtained through theopen-market purchase of fractional positions in companies with excellent business franchises and competent, honest managements. We never expect to run these companies, but we do expect to profit from them.

我們也發現很容易從市場買到一些由有能力且正直的人所經營的公司股票,而事實上我們也從未打算自己去經營這些公司,但我們的確想要藉由投資這些公司而獲利。

We expect that undistributed earnings from such companies willproduce full value (subject to tax when realized) for Berkshire and its shareholders. If they don’t, we have made mistakes as to either: (1) the management we have elected to join; (2) the future economics of the business; or (3) the price we have paid.

而我們也預期這些公司的未分配盈餘(在扣除所得稅後)將會100%回餽給Berkshire及其股東,當然若最後沒有,可能是出了以下幾種差錯(1)我們所選擇的經營階層有問題(2)公司的前景有問題(3)我們付的價格有問題。

We have made plenty of such mistakes - both in the purchase ofnon-controlling and controlling interests in businesses. Category (2)miscalculations are the most common. Of course, it is necessary to dig deep into our history to find illustrations of such mistakes - sometimes as deep as two or three months back. For example, last year your Chairman volunteered his expert opinion on the rosy future of the aluminum business. Several minor adjustments to that opinion - now aggregating approximately 180 degrees - have since been required.

而事實上,我們不論在買進具控制權或不具控制權的股權時,皆曾犯了許多錯誤,其中以第二類誤判的情況最常見,當然要翻開我們投資的歷史才能找得到這樣的案例(可能至少要回溯至少二、三個月以上吧…),例如去年本人就曾發表看好鋁業發展的前景,只是到後來陸續經過些微的調整,最後的結論卻是一百八十度的轉彎。

For personal as well as more objective reasons, however, we generally have been able to correct such mistakes far more quickly in the case of non-controlled businesses (marketable securities) than in the case of controlled subsidiaries. Lack of control, in effect, often has turned out to be an economic plus.

然而基於個人與客觀的理由,通常我們在改正對不具控制權股票投資的錯誤要比對具控制權的來得容易許多,這時候缺少控制權,反而成為一種優勢。

As we mentioned last year, the magnitude of our non-recorded“ownership” earnings has grown to the point where their total is greater than our reported operating earnings. We expect this situation will continue. In just four ownership positions in this category - GEICO Corporation, General Foods Corporation, R. J. Reynolds Industries, Inc. and The Washington Post Company - our share of undistributed and therefore unrecorded earnings probably will total well over $35 million in 1982. The accounting rules that entirely ignore these undistributed earnings diminish the utility of our annual return on equity calculation, or any other single year measure of economic performance.

而就像去年我曾提到的,我們在不具控制權的股權投資依投資比例可分得之未分配盈餘其規模甚至超越我們公司本身的帳面盈餘,且我們預期這種情況將會持續下去,1982年光是其中四家(GEICO、General Foods、R.J.Reynolds 及華盛頓郵報)加起來就超過3,500萬美元,由於會計原則規定,使得我們在計算帳面股東權益報酬與單一年度獲利表現時,無法將這些未分配盈餘記入。

Long-Term Corporate Performance
企業長期績效表現

In measuring long-term economic performance, equities held by ourinsurance subsidiaries are valued at market subject to a charge reflecting the amount of taxes that would have to be paid if unrealized gains were actually realized. If we are correct in the premise stressed in the preceding section of this report, our unreported ownership earnings will find their way, irregularly but inevitably, into our net worth. To date, this has been the case.

在衡量一家公司長期的績效表現時,我們保險子公司所持有的股票會以市價(扣除預估應付所得稅),而若我們前面所作的推論正確的話,那些不具控制權的股權其未分配盈餘,雖然不規則但最後終究會反映在我們公司帳上,至少到目前為止情況確是如此。

An even purer calculation of performance would involve a valuation of bonds and non-insurance held equities at market. However, GAAPaccounting does not prescribe this procedure, and the added purity would change results only very slightly. Should any valuation difference widen to significant proportions, as it has at most major insurance companies, we will report its effect to you.

當然嚴格來說,還必須把債券投資及非保險子公司所持有的股票以市價計算才更準確,然而GAAP(一般公認會計原則)並未如此規定,而且這樣做對我們來說其實影響也不大,當然若其影響大到一定程度,(就像目前很多保險同業便是如此),我一定會向各位報告。

On a GAAP basis, during the present management’s term of seventeen years, book value has increased from $19.46 per share to $526.02 per share, or 21.1% compounded annually. This rate of return number is highly likely to drift downward in future years. We hope, however, that it can be maintained significantly above the rate of return achieved by the average large American corporation.

在GAAP的基礎下,公司的帳面價值,自現有經營階層接手的17年以來,已從19.46美元增加到如今的526.02美元,年複合成長率約為21.1%,只是這個比率在未來將會逐年下滑,但我們期望它至少能夠高於一般美國大企業的平均水準。

Over half of the large gain in Berkshire ’s net worth during 1981 - ittotaled $124 million, or about 31% - resulted from the market performance of a single investment, GEICO Corporation. In aggregate, our market gain from securities during the year considerably outstripped the gain in underlying business values. Such market variations will not always be on the pleasant side.

在1981年淨值增加的1億2,000萬美元中,約有一半要歸功於GEICO一家公司,總的來說,今年我們投資股票市值的增加要比其背後實際代表的實質價值增加數要大得多,而請注意股票市值的表現不會永遠比實質價值好。

In past reports we have explained how inflation has caused ourapparently satisfactory long-term corporate performance to be illusory as a measure of true investment results for our owners. We applaud the efforts of Federal Reserve Chairman Volcker and note the currently more moderate increases in various price indices. Nevertheless, our views regarding long-term inflationary trends are as negative as ever. Like virginity, a stable price level seems capable of maintenance, but not of restoration.

過去我們曾解釋通貨膨脹是如何使我們的帳面表現比經濟實質要好看的多,我們對Fed(聯邦準備理事會)主席 Volcker先生所作的努力使得現在所有的物價指數能溫和的成長表示感謝,儘管如此,我們仍對未來的通膨趨勢感到悲觀,就像是童真一樣,穩定的物價只能維持現狀,卻沒有辦法使其恢復原狀。

Despite the overriding importance of inflation in the investmentequation, we will not punish you further with another full recital of our views; inflation itself will be punishment enough. (Copies of previous discussions are available for masochists.) But, because of the unrelenting destruction of currency values, our corporate efforts will continue to do a much better job of filling your wallet than of filling your stomach.

儘管通膨對投資來講實在是太重要了,但我不會再折磨你們把我們的觀點在複述一遍,因為通膨本身對大家的折磨就已足夠了(若誰有被虐狂可向我索取複本) ,但由於通膨間斷不止的使貨幣貶值,公司只能儘力的使你的皮夾滿滿,更勝於填飽你的肚子。

Equity Value-Added
股權附加價值

An additional factor should further subdue any residual enthusiasmyou may retain regarding our long-term rate of return. The economic case justifying equity investment is that, in aggregate, additional earnings above passive investment returns - interest on fixed-income securities - will be derived through the employment of managerial and entrepreneurial skills in conjunction with that equity capital. Furthermore, the case says that since the equity capital position is associated with greater risk than passive formsof investment, it is “entitled” to higher returns. A “value-added” bonus from equity capital seems natural and certain.

另外一項因素可能使各位對公司投資報酬率的熱情再澆上一盆冷水,人們之所以要投資公司股權而非固定收益債券的理由,係在於公司經營階層可運用這筆資金來創造比固定利息收入更高的盈餘,從而人們才願意承擔萬一發生損失的風險,所以額外的風險貼水是理所當然的。

But is it? Several decades back, a return on equity of as little as 10%enabled a corporation to be classified as a “good” business - i.e., one in which a dollar reinvested in the business logically could be expected to be valued by the market at more than one hundred cents. For, with long-term taxable bonds yielding 5% and long-term tax-exempt bonds 3%, a business operation that could utilize equity capital at 10% clearly was worth some premium to investors over the equity capital employed. That was true even though a combination of taxes on dividends and on capital gains would reduce the 10% earned by the corporation to perhaps 6%-8% in the hands ofthe individual investor.

但事實真是如此嗎?? 過去數十年來,一家公司的股東權益報酬率只要超過10%,便可以被歸類為一家優良企業,所以當我們把一塊錢投入到這家公司,其將來能產生的經濟效益將會大於一塊錢,(考量到當時長期債券殖利率約為5%,而免稅公債則約3%),因為即使考量稅負成本,實際到投資人手中仍能有6%-8%。

Investment markets recognized this truth. During that earlier period,American business earned an average of 11% or so on equity capitalemployed and stocks, in aggregate, sold at valuations far above that equity capital (book value), averaging over 150 cents on the dollar. Most businesses were “good” businesses because they earned far more than their keep (the return on long-term passive money). The value-added produced by equity investment, in aggregate, was substantial.

股票市場認同這種道理,在過去的一段時間,一家股東權益報酬率達到11%的公司,其市價約可以漲到淨值的1.5倍,他們之所以被認定為好公司的原因在於他們賺取的盈餘遠多於原先保留下來的部份,這些公司所產生的附加價值相當可觀。

That day is gone. But the lessons learned during its existence aredifficult to discard. While investors and managers must place their feet in the future, their memories and nervous systems often remain plugged into the past. It is much easier for investors to utilize historic p/e ratios or for managers to utilize historic business valuation yardsticks than it is for either group to rethink their premises daily. When change is slow, constant rethinking is actually undesirable; it achieves little and slows response time. But when change is great, yesterday’s assumptions can be retained only at great cost. And the pace of economic change has become breathtaking.

然而這一切已成過去,但過去所得到的經驗法則卻很難拋棄,「當投資大眾與經營階層一腳踏進未來,他們的腦子與神經系統卻還深陷於過去。」投資大眾慣於利用歷史的本益比而經營階層則習慣用傳統企業評價標準,但卻不去深思其前提是否早已改變,但現狀的改變極其緩慢,那麼持續不斷地思考便變得相當必要,而一旦變化快速,則拘泥於昨日的假設將會付出極大的代價,而目前經濟步調的變動速度快到令人窒息。

During the past year, long-term taxable bond yields exceeded 16%and long-term tax-exempts 14%. The total return achieved from such tax-exempts, of course, goes directly into the pocket of the individual owner. Meanwhile, American business is producing earnings of only about 14% on equity. And this 14% will be substantially reduced by taxation before it can be banked by the individual owner. The extent of such shrinkage depends upon the dividend policy of the corporation and the tax rates applicable to the investor.

去年長期債券殖利率超過16%,而免稅公債則約為14%,而這些收入直接落入投資人的口袋,在此同時,美國企業的股東權益報酬率卻只有14%,而且尚未考量落入投資人口袋前所須支付的稅負(視被投資公司的股利政策與投資人適用的所得稅率而定)。

Thus, with interest rates on passive investments at late 1981 levels, a typical American business is no longer worth one hundred cents on the dollar to owners who are individuals. (If the business is owned by pension funds or other tax-exempt investors, the arithmetic, although still unenticing, changes substantially for the better.) Assume an investor in a 50% tax bracket; if our typical company pays out all earnings, the income return to the investor will be equivalent to that from a 7% tax-exempt bond. And, if conditions persist - if all earnings are paid out and return on equity stays at 14% - the 7% tax-exempt equivalent to the higher-bracket individual investor is just as frozen as is the coupon on a tax-exempt bond. Such a perpetual 7% tax-exempt bond might be worth fifty cents on the
dollar as this is written.

以1981年的標準而言,投資一家美國公司一塊錢所產生的經濟價值還低於一塊錢,(當然若投資人是免稅的退休基金或慈善機構,則情況可能會好一點),假設投資人係適用於50%稅率級距,而公司把所有盈餘皆發放出來,則股東的投資報酬率約略等於投資7%的免稅債券,而這種情況若一直持續下去,投資人等於是套牢在一堆長期7%的免稅債券一樣,而它真正的價值可能連其原始投資額的一半還不到。

If, on the other hand, all earnings of our typical American business are retained and return on equity again remains constant, earnings will grow at 14% per year. If the p/e ratio remains constant, the price of our typical stock will also grow at 14% per year. But that 14% is not yet in the pocket of the shareholder. Putting it there will require the payment of a capital gains tax, presently assessed at a maximum rate of 20%. This net return, of course, works out to a poorer rate of return than the currently available passive after-tax rate.

但如果把所有盈餘都保留起來,而報酬率維持不變,則盈餘每年會以14%的速度增加,又假設本益比不變,則公司的股價每年也會以14%的比例增加,但增加的部份卻不算是已落入股東的口袋,因為收回去的話需要付最高約20%的資本利得稅,所以不管怎麼說,還是比最基本的免稅公債14%低。

Unless passive rates fall, companies achieving 14% per year gains inearnings per share while paying no cash dividend are an economic failure for their individual shareholders. The returns from passive capital outstrip the returns from active capital. This is an unpleasant fact for both investors and corporate managers and, therefore, one they may wish to ignore. But facts do not cease to exist, either because they are unpleasant or because they are ignored.

因此除非基本報酬率降低,否則即使公司盈餘每年以14% 成長,對從未能收到半毛錢股利的投資人而言,等於是一無所獲,這對股東與經營階層都是不怎麼愉快的經驗,而更是後者希望掩飾過去的,但不論如何,事實就是事實。

Most American businesses pay out a significant portion of theirearnings and thus fall between the two examples. And most American businesses are currently “bad” businesses economically - producing less for their individual investors after-tax than the tax-exempt passive rate of return on money. Of course, some high-return businesses still remain attractive, even under present conditions. But American equity capital, in aggregate, produces no value-added for individual investors.

多數的美國公司都把大部份的盈餘分配出去,所以算是介於兩個極端的例子之間,而大部份美國公司目前的稅後投資報酬率卻都比投資免稅債券還差,當然也有少數例外,但如今總的來說,美國公司並未為投資人貢獻任何附加的價值。

It should be stressed that this depressing situation does not occurbecause corporations are jumping, economically, less high than previously. In fact, they are jumping somewhat higher: return on equity has improved a few points in the past decade. But the crossbar of passive return has been elevated much faster. Unhappily, most companies can do little but hope that the bar will be lowered significantly; there are few industries in which the prospects seem bright for substantial gains in return on equity.

但要強調的是,我並不是說所有美國公司表現的比以往差,事實上,反而是比以前還要好一點,只是最低門檻比以前提高了許多,而遺憾的是,大部分的企業對此皆束手無策,只能祈求門檻能夠大幅降低,極少有產業能為股東賺取高投資報酬的。

Inflationary experience and expectations will be major (but not theonly) factors affecting the height of the crossbar in future years. If the causes of long-term inflation can be tempered, passive returns are likely to fall and the intrinsic position of American equity capital should significantly improve. Many businesses that now must be classified as economically “bad” would be restored to the “good” category under such circumstances.

過去的通膨經驗與對未來通膨的預期將會是影響未來通膨指數的最主要(但非惟一)因素,如果長期性通膨的形成原因能有效被抑制,則門檻自然會降低,美國企業的存在價值將因此大幅改善,原本被歸類為不良的企業也能轉為優良的企業。

A further, particularly ironic, punishment is inflicted by an inflationary environment upon the owners of the “bad” business. To continue operating in its present mode, such a low-return business usually must retain much of its earnings - no matter what penalty such a policy produces for shareholders.

而通貨膨脹對於體質不佳的企業來說,更是雪上加霜,為了要維持既有的營業規模,這類低投資報酬率的公司往往必須保留住大部分的盈餘,不管對於股東的權益有多大的損害也莫可奈何。

Reason, of course, would prescribe just the opposite policy. Anindividual, stuck with a 5% bond with many years to run before maturity, does not take the coupons from that bond and pay one hundred cents on the dollar for more 5% bonds while similar bonds are available at, say, forty cents on the dollar. Instead, he takes those coupons from his low-return bond and - if inclined to reinvest - looks for the highest return with safety currently available. Good money is not thrown after bad.

當然理智會導引人們採取不同的方法,以一個個人套牢在殖利率5%的債券來說,就不可能將好不容易拿回的5%利息,以票面價格重新投入到原有的債券,因為類似的債券在市場上可能以四折的價格就能買到,而通常的情況下,如果果真要投資,他應該會再尋找更好的投資標的,良幣是不會追逐劣幣的。

What makes sense for the bondholder makes sense for theshareholder. Logically, a company with historic and prospective highreturns on equity should retain much or all of its earnings so that
shareholders can earn premium returns on enhanced capital. Conversely, low returns on corporate equity would suggest a very high dividend payout so that owners could direct capital toward more attractive areas. (The Scriptures concur. In the parable of the talents, the two high-earning servants are rewarded with 100% retention of earnings and encouraged to expand their operations. However, the non-earning third servant is not only chastised - “wicked and slothful” - but also is required to redirect allof his capital to the top performer. Matthew 25: 14-30)

這種債券投資的道理也適用於股票投資之上,理論上如果說這家公司報酬率相對較高,那麼把盈餘留在公司繼續投資下去,但若這家公司報酬率差,那麼為何不把賺的盈餘分配給股東,讓股東自己去尋找其他報酬率較高投資機會呢??(古經文亦贊同:有個三個僕人的寓言,老天爺讓其中二個會賺錢的僕人,保留他們所賺的錢並鼓勵他們擴大營業,而另外一個懶惰不會賺錢的僕人,則被嚴厲得逞罰並叫他把錢交給前面二個僕人管理/馬修第25章。

But inflation takes us through the looking glass into the upside-down world of Alice in Wonderland. When prices continuously rise, the “bad” business must retain every nickel that it can. Not because it is attractive as a repository for equity capital, but precisely because it is so unattractive, the low-return business must follow a high retention policy. If it wishes to continue operating in the future as it has in the past - and most entities, including businesses, do - it simply has no choice.

但通膨就像叫我們透過窺鏡看愛麗絲夢遊仙境一樣,當通膨恃虐時,體質不良的企業被迫保留它所有的每一分錢,才能辛苦地維持過去擁有的生產能力,這實在是情非得已。

For inflation acts as a gigantic corporate tapeworm. That tapeworm preemptively consumes its requisite daily diet of investment dollarsregardless of the health of the host organism. Whatever the level ofreported profits (even if nil), more dollars for receivables, inventory and fixed assets are continuously required by the business in order to merely match the unit volume of the previous year. The less prosperous the enterprise, the greater the proportion of available sustenance claimed by the tapeworm.

通膨就像是寄生在企業體內巨大的條蟲,不管被它寄生的主人身體狀況如何,還是拼命的從他身上吸取養份,所以不管公司的獲利到底有多少(就算沒有也一樣),帳上總是會有越來越多的應收帳款、存貨與固定資產以維持以往的營運規模,主人的身體越差,就表示有越多比例的養份被寄生蟲吸走。

Under present conditions, a business earning 8% or 10% on equity often has no leftovers for expansion, debt reduction or “real” dividends. The tapeworm of inflation simply cleans the plate. (The low-return company’s inability to pay dividends, understandably, is often disguised. Corporate America increasingly is turning to dividend reinvestment plans, sometimes even embodying a discount arrangement that all but forces shareholders to reinvest. Other companies sell newly issued shares to Peter in order to pay dividends to Paul. Beware of “dividends” that can be paid out only if someone promises to replace the capital distributed.)

以目前的情況來說,一家公司若只賺到8% 或10% 利潤的話,根本不夠拿來用於擴張、還債或發放實在的股利,通膨這條寄生蟲早就把盤子清光光了,(而事實上,通常美國企業會利用許多方法將無法發放股利的窘境掩飾住,例如常常提出盈餘轉投資計劃,強迫股東再投資,或是發行新股,拿張三的錢發放給李四,要小心這種必須要另外找到金主才能發放的股利)。

Berkshire continues to retain its earnings for offensive, not defensive or obligatory, reasons. But in no way are we immune from the pressures that escalating passive returns exert on equity capital. We continue to clear the crossbar of after-tax passive return - but barely. Our historic 21% return - not at all assured for the future - still provides, after the current capital gain tax rate (which we expect to rise considerably in future years), a modest margin over current after-tax rates on passive money. It would be a bit humiliating to have our corporate value-added turn negative.But it can happen here as it has elsewhere, either from events outside anyone’s control or from poor relative adaptation on our part.

反觀Berkshire通常會因積極而非被動的理由而保留盈餘再投資,當然我們也不能免除前述通膨的威脅,我們歷史累計的報酬率21%扣除潛在的資本利得稅後,持續地跨過那最低的門檻,但也只能算是低空掠過,只要在出一些差錯,便可能使我們面臨讓股東創造負價值的窘境。這種情況不能保證完全不會發生,有可能是外在不可控因素,也有可能是我們自己內部的因素。

Sources of Reported Earnings
盈餘報告

The table below shows the sources of Berkshire ’s reported earnings.Berkshire owns about 60% of Blue Chip Stamps which, in turn, owns 80% of Wesco Financial Corporation. The table displays aggregate operating earnings of the various business entities, as well as Berkshire ’s share of those earnings. All of the significant gains and losses attributable to unusual sales of assets by any of the business entities are aggregated with securities transactions in the line near the bottom of the table and are not included in operating earnings.

下表顯示Berkshire依照各個公司持股比例來列示帳面盈餘的主要來源,而各個公司資本利得損失並不包含在內而是彙總於下表最後「已實現出售證券利得」一欄,雖然本表列示的方式與一般公認會計原則不儘相同但最後的損益數字卻是一致的: 其中Berkshire擁有Blue Chips Stamps 60%的股權,而後者又擁有 Wesco 財務公司 80% 的股權。

Net Earnings
Earnings Before Income Taxes After Tax
-------------------------------- ------------------
Total Berkshire Share Berkshire Share
--------------- ---------------- ------------------
1981 1980 1981 1980 1981 1980
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
(000s omitted)
Operating Earnings:
Insurance Group:
Underwriting ............ $ 1,478 $ 6,738 $ 1,478 $ 6,737 $ 798 $ 3,637
Net Investment Income ... 38,823 30,939 38,823 30,927 32,401 25,607
Berkshire-Waumbec Textiles (2,669) (508) (2,669) (508) (1,493) 202
Associated Retail Stores .. 1,763 2,440 1,763 2,440 759 1,169
See’s Candies ............. 21,891 15,475 13,046 9,223 6,289 4,459
Buffalo Evening News ...... (1,057) (2,777) (630) (1,655) (276) (800)
Blue Chip Stamps - Parent 3,642 7,699 2,171 4,588 2,134 3,060
Wesco Financial - Parent .. 4,495 2,916 2,145 1,392 1,590 1,044
Mutual Savings and Loan ... 1,605 5,814 766 2,775 1,536 1,974
Precision Steel ........... 3,453 2,833 1,648 1,352 841 656
Interest on Debt .......... (14,656) (12,230) (12,649) (9,390) (6,671) (4,809)
Other* .................... 1,895 1,698 1,344 1,308 1,513 992
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
Sub-total - Continuing
Operations ............. $ 60,663 $ 61,037 $ 47,236 $ 49,189 $ 39,421 $ 37,191
Illinois National Bank** .. -- 5,324 -- 5,200 -- 4,731
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
Operating Earnings .......... 60,663 66,361 47,236 54,389 39,421 41,922
Sales of securities and
unusual sales of assets .. 37,801 19,584 33,150 15,757 23,183 11,200
-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- --------
Total Earnings - all entities $ 98,464 $ 85,945 $ 80,386 $ 70,146 $ 62,604 $ 53,122
===== ====== ====== ====== ====== ======
*Amortization of intangibles arising in accounting for purchases of businesses (i.e. See’s, Mutual and Buffalo Evening News) is reflected in the category designated as “Other”.**Berkshire divested itself of its ownership of the Illinois National Bank on December 31, 1980.
*1 包含購併企業商譽的攤銷(如See's Candies; Mutual; Buffalio Evening News等)
*2 Illinois National Bank 已於1980.12.31 從Berkshire脫離出去
Blue Chip Stamps and Wesco are public companies with reportingrequirements of their own. On pages 38-50 of this report we have reproduced the narrative reports of the principal executives of both
companies, in which they describe 1981 operations. A copy of the full annual report of either company will be mailed to any Berkshire shareholder upon request to Mr. Robert H. Bird for Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040, or to Mrs. Jeanne Leach for Wesco Financial Corporation, 315 East Colorado Boulevard, Pasadena, California 91109.

Blue Chip 及Wesco 兩家公司因為本身是公開發行公司以規定編有自己的年報,我建議大家仔細閱讀。若有需要Berkshire的股東可向Mr. Robert(地址:加州洛杉磯5801 South Eastern Avenue)索取藍籌郵票的年報或向Mrs. Bette(地址:加州Pasadena 315 East Colorado Boulevard)索取Wesco的年報。

As we indicated earlier, undistributed earnings in companies we do not control are now fully as important as the reported operating earnings detailed in the preceding table. The distributed portion of earnings, of course, finds its way into the table primarily through the net investment income segment of Insurance Group earnings.

就像先前我們所提到的,不具控制權的股權投資其已分配的盈餘已列示於保險事業的投資收益之中,但未分配盈餘佔本公司的重要性已不下於前面表列的帳面盈餘。

We show below Berkshire ’s proportional holdings in thosenon-controlled businesses for which only distributed earnings (dividends) are included in our earnings.

下表列示的是那些我們不具控制權的股權投資的持股:

No. of Shares Cost Market
------------- ---------- ----------
(000s omitted)
451,650 (a) Affiliated Publications, Inc. ........ $ 3,297 $ 14,114
703,634 (a) Aluminum Company of America .......... 19,359 18,031
420,441 (a) Arcata Corporation
(including common equivalents) ..... 14,076 15,136
475,217 (b) Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Company ........ 12,942 14,362
441,522 (a) GATX Corporation ..................... 17,147 13,466
2,101,244 (b) General Foods, Inc. .................. 66,277 66,714
7,200,000 (a) GEICO Corporation .................... 47,138 199,800
2,015,000 (a) Handy & Harman ....................... 21,825 36,270
711,180 (a) Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc. 4,531 23,202
282,500 (a) Media General ........................ 4,545 11,088
391,400 (a) Ogilvy & Mather International Inc. ... 3,709 12,329
370,088 (b) Pinkerton’s, Inc. .................... 12,144 19,675
1,764,824 (b) R. J. Reynolds Industries, Inc. ...... 76,668 83,127
785,225 (b) SAFECO Corporation ................... 21,329 31,016
1,868,600 (a) The Washington Post Company .......... 10,628 58,160
---------- ----------
$335,615 $616,490
All Other Common Stockholdings ...................... 16,131 22,739
---------- ----------
Total Common Stocks ................................. $351,746 $639,229
========== ==========
(a) All owned by Berkshire or its insurance subsidiaries.
(b) Blue Chip and/or Wesco own shares of these companies. All
numbers represent Berkshire ’s net interest in the larger gross holdings of the group.

(a) 代表全部股權由Berkshire及其子公司所持有

(b) 代表由Berkshire子公司Blue Chip與Wesco 所持有,依Berkshire持股比例換算得來。

Our controlled and non-controlled businesses operate over such a wide spectrum of activities that detailed commentary here would prove too lengthy. Much additional financial information is included in Management’s Discussion on pages 34-37 and in the narrative reports on pages 38-50. However, our largest area of both controlled and non-controlled activity has been, and almost certainly will continue to be, the property-casualty insurance area, and commentary on important developments in that industry is appropriation

由於我們具控制權與不具控制權的企業經營遍佈各行各業,所以恕我無法在此贅述,但無論如何,集團的重點一定是擺在產險/意外險之上,所以有必要對其產業未來發展加以說明。

Insurance Industry Conditions
保險產業現況

“Forecasts”, said Sam Goldwyn, “are dangerous, particularly those about the future.” ( Berkshire shareholders may have reached a similar conclusion after rereading our past annual reports featuring your Chairman’s prescient analysis of textile prospects.)

「預測」如同媒體傳播巨擘米高梅創辦人Sam Goldwyn所說的是相當危險的,「尤其是關於對未來的預測」,(如果Berkshire的股東在過去的年報中讀到本人對紡織業未來的分析後,可能也會深有同感)。

There is no danger, however, in forecasting that 1982 will be the worst year in recent history for insurance underwriting. That result already has been guaranteed by present pricing behavior, coupled with the term nature of the insurance contract.

但若是有人要預測1982年的保險業核保結果可能會很慘,那就不會有什麼好怕的了,因為情勢已經由目前同業的殺價行為加上保險契約先天的性質獲得了印證。

While many auto policies are priced and sold at six-month intervals - and many property policies are sold for a three-year term - a weighted average of the duration of all property-casualty insurance policies probably runs a little under twelve months. And prices for the insurance coverage,of course, are frozen for the life of the contract. Thus, this year’s sales contracts (“premium written” in the parlance of the industry) determine about one-half of next year’s level of revenue (“premiums earned”). The remaining half will be determined by sales contracts written next year that will be about 50% earned in that year. The profitability consequences are automatic: if you make a mistake in pricing, you have to live with it for an uncomfortable period of time.

當許多汽車保險保單以六個月為期來訂價並發售,而其他產物意外保險則以三年為期,所以意外保險保單流通的期間平均略低於十二個月,當然價格在保險合約的期間內是固定的,因此今年銷售的合約(業內的說法,稱之為保費收入)決定了明年保費收入水準的半數,至於另外一半則由明年簽下的保險契約來決定,因此獲利的情況自然而然會遞延,也就是說若你在訂價上犯了錯誤,那你所受的痛苦可能會持續一陣子。

Note in the table below the year-over-year gain in industry-wide premiums written and the impact that it has on the current and following year’s level of underwriting profitability. The result is exactly as you would expect in an inflationary world. When the volume gain is well up in double digits, it bodes well for profitability trends in the current and following year. When the industry volume gain is small, underwriting experience very shortly will get worse, no matter how unsatisfactory the current level.

注意下表所列為每年保費收入成長率以及其對當年與隔年度獲利的影響,而結果正如同你在通膨高漲時所預期的一樣,當保費收入以二位數成長,則當年與隔年的獲利數字就會很好看,但若保費收入僅能以個位數成長,則表示核保結果就會變得很差。

The Best’s data in the table reflect the experience of practically theentire industry, including stock, mutual and reciprocal companies. The combined ratio indicates total operating and loss costs as compared to premiums; a ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss.

下表反映一般同業所面臨的情勢,綜合比率表示所有營運成本加上理賠損失佔保費收入的比率,百分之一百以下表示有承保利益,反之則表示有損失:

Yearly Change Yearly Change Combined Ratioin Premium in Premium after Policy-
Written (%) Earned (%) holder Dividends
------------- ------------- ----------------
1972 ............... 10.2 10.9 96.2
1973 ............... 8.0 8.8 99.2
1974 ............... 6.2 6.9 105.4
1975 ............... 11.0 9.6 107.9
1976 ............... 21.9 19.4 102.4
1977 ............... 19.8 20.5 97.2
1978 ............... 12.8 14.3 97.5
1979 ............... 10.3 10.4 100.6
1980 ............... 6.0 7.8 103.1
1981 ............... 3.6 4.1 105.7
Source: Best’s Aggregates and Averages.
As Pogo would say, “The future isn’t what it used to be.” Currentpricing practices promise devastating results, particularly if the respite from major natural disasters that the industry has enjoyed in recent years should end. For underwriting experience has been getting worse in spite of good luck, not because of bad luck. In recent years hurricanes have stayed at sea and motorists have reduced their driving. They won’t always be soobliging.

誠如Pogo 所說:「未來絕對不會和過去相同」。現在的訂價習慣已註定日後悲慘的結果,尤其若因近幾年無重大災難所和得的喘息機會結束時。保險承保的情況會因大家運氣好(而非運氣壞)而變差,近幾年來颶風大多僅停留在海上,同時摩托車騎士較少在路上跑,但他們不會永遠都那麼守規矩。

And, of course the twin inflations, monetary and “social” (the tendency of courts and juries to stretch the coverage of policies beyond what insurers, relying upon contract terminology and precedent, had expected), are unstoppable. Costs of repairing both property and people - and the extent to which these repairs are deemed to be the responsibility of the insurer - will advance relentlessly.

當然貨幣與社會(法院與陪審團對保險投保範圍認定超越合約與判例的擴張)的雙重通貨膨脹是無法抵檔的,財產的修補與人身的醫療等這些被視為保險公司的當然責任,所引發的成本將會無止盡的擴張。

Absent any bad luck (catastrophes, increased driving, etc.), animmediate industry volume gain of at least 10% per year probably isnecessary to stabilize the record level of underwriting losses that will automatically prevail in mid-1982. (Most underwriters expect incurred losses in aggregate to rise at least 10% annually; each, of course, counts on getting less than his share.) Every percentage point of annual premium growth below the 10% equilibrium figure quickens the pace of deterioration. Quarterly data in 1981 underscore the conclusion that a terrible underwriting picture is worsening at an accelerating rate.

若沒遇上什麼倒霉事(如大災難或駕駛行為增加等)同業保費收入平均至少要增加十個百分點才能使1982年的承銷比率不會再惡化(大部份同業估計承擔損失每年以十個百分點成長,當然大家都期望自己公司成長較少)。每個保費收入成長的百分點都會加速影響到核保成績惡化的程度,1981年按季的核保成績低估了惡化的速度。

In the 1980 annual report we discussed the investment policies that have destroyed the integrity of many insurers’ balance sheets, forcing them to abandon underwriting discipline and write business at any price in order to avoid negative cash flow. It was clear that insurers with large holdings of bonds valued, for accounting purposes, at nonsensically high prices would have little choice but to keep the money revolving by selling large numbers of policies at nonsensically low prices. Such insurers necessarily fear a major decrease in volume more than they fear a major underwriting
loss.

去年年報我們曾經提到許多保險公司因投資不當使得其公司財務變得很不健全,迫使他們放棄原有承保原則,不惜以低價承接保單以維持既有流動性。很明顯的帳上持有不合理高估的債券的同業,為了現金週轉而以明顯不合理的低價大量賣出保單,他們害怕保單收入的減少更甚於核保所可能增加的損失。

But, unfortunately, all insurers are affected; it’s difficult to price much differently than your most threatened competitor. This pressure continues unabated and adds a new motivation to the others that drive many insurance managers to push for business; worship of size over profitability, and the fear that market share surrendered never can be regained.

然而不幸的是所有的同業皆因此受波及,因為你的價格不可能與競爭同業差得太遠,這種壓力未曾稍減,並迫使愈來愈多的同業跟進,盲目追求量的成長而非質的增加,同時又害怕失去的市場佔有率永遠無法回復。

Whatever the reasons, we believe it is true that virtually no major property-casualty insurer - despite protests by the entire industry that rates are inadequate and great selectivity should be exercised - has been willing to turn down business to the point where cash flow has turned significantly negative. Absent such a willingness, prices will remain under severe pressure.

即使大家一致認同費率極不合理,我們認為沒有一家保險業者,能夠承受現金極度流出的情況下不接任何保單,而只要這種心態存在,則保單價格將持續面臨調降壓力。

Commentators continue to talk of the underwriting cycle, usually implying a regularity of rhythm and a relatively constant midpoint ofprofitability Our own view is different. We believe that very large, although obviously varying, underwriting losses will be the norm for the industry, and that the best underwriting years in the future decade may appear substandard against the average year of the past decade.

對於專家一再認定保險產業的循環具規則性且長期而言核保損益接近兩平,我們則抱持不同的看法,我們相信核保面臨鉅額損失(雖然程度不一)將成為保險業界的常態,未來十年內最好的表現在以往僅能算得上是普通而已。

We have no magic formula to insulate our controlled insurance companies against this deteriorating future. Our managers, particularly Phil Liesche, Bill Lyons, Roland Miller, Floyd Taylor and Milt Thornton, have done a magnificent job of swimming against the tide. We have sacrificed much volume, but have maintained a substantial underwriting superiority in relation to industry-wide results. The outlook at Berkshire is for continued low volume. Our financial position offers us maximum flexibility, a very rare condition in the property-casualty insurance industry. And, at some point, should fear ever prevail throughout the industry, our financial strength could become an operational asset of immense value.

雖然面臨持續惡化的未來,Berkshire的保險事業並無任何良方,但我們經營階層確已儘力力爭上游,雖然核保保單數量減少了,但核保損益相較於同業仍顯優越。展望未來,Berkshire將維持低保單的現狀,我們的財務實力使我們能保持最大的彈性,這在同業間並不多見。而將來總有一天,當同業保單接到怕之時,Berkshire財務實力將成為營運發展最有利的後盾。

We believe that GEICO Corporation, our major non-controlled business operating in this field, is, by virtue of its extreme and improving operating efficiency, in a considerably more protected position than almost any other major insurer. GEICO is a brilliantly run implementation of a very important business idea.

其中我們不具控制權的主要股權投資的GEICO更是個中翹楚,它的營運績效日起有功,比起其他同業的情況要好的許多,它堪稱企業理念的最佳實踐典範。

Shareholder Designated Contributions
股東指定捐贈計畫

Our new program enabling shareholders to designate the recipients of corporate charitable contributions was greeted with extraordinary enthusiasm. A copy of the letter sent October 14, 1981 describing this program appears on pages 51-53. Of 932,206 shares eligible for participation (shares where the name of the actual owner appeared on our stockholder record), 95.6% responded. Even excluding Buffet-related shares, the response topped 90%.

我們讓使得所有股東皆能指定其個別捐贈單位的新計劃受到廣大回響,在932,206張有效股份中(即在本公司股份係由本人登記者),有95.6%回復,而在即使不包含本人股份的情況下,也有超過90%的成績。

In addition, more than 3% of our shareholders voluntarily wrote letters or notes, all but one approving of the program. Both the level of participation and of commentary surpass any shareholder response we have witnessed, even when such response has been intensively solicited by corporate staff and highly paid professional proxy organizations. In contrast, your extraordinary level of response occurred without even the nudge of a company-provided return envelope. This self-propelled behavior speaks well for the program, and speaks well for our shareholders.

此外有3%的股東主動寫信來支持本計劃,而股東參與的熱烈與提供的意見,也是我們前所未見,這種自動自發的態度說明了本計劃成功與否,也可看出Berkshire股東的天性。

Apparently the owners of our corporation like both possessing and exercising the ability to determine where gifts of their funds shall be made. The “father-knows-best” school of corporate governance will be surprised to find that none of our shareholders sent in a designation sheet with instructions that the officers of Berkshire - in their superior wisdom, of course - make the decision on charitable funds applicable to his shares. Nor did anyone suggest that his share of our charitable funds be used to match contributions made by our corporate directors to charities of the directors’ choice (a popular, proliferating and non-publicized policy at many large corporations).

很明顯的,他們不但希望能擁有且能自由掌控其所欲捐贈金錢的去向,教授父權式的管理學院可能會驚訝的發現,沒有一位股東表示希望由Berkshire的經營階層來幫他們作決定或是依董監事捐贈比例行事 (這是目前一般美國大企業普遍的作法)。

All told, $1,783,655 of shareholder-designed contributions were distributed to about 675 charities. In addition, Berkshire and subsidiaries continue to make certain contributions pursuant to local level decisions made by our operating managers.

除了由Berkshire及其子公司經營階層決定的捐獻外,總計1,783,655美元的股東指定捐贈款共分配給675個慈善機關團體。除此之外,Berkshire以及其子公司仍將繼續其以往由其經理人決定的捐贈慣例。

There will be some years, perhaps two or three out of ten, when contributions by Berkshire will produce substandard tax deductions - or none at all. In those years we will not effect our shareholder designated charitable program. In all other years we expect to inform you about October 10th of the amount per share that you may designate. A reply form will accompany the notice, and you will be given about three weeks to respond with your designation. To qualify, your shares must be registered in your own name or the name of an owning trust, corporation, partnership or estate, if applicable, on our stockholder list of September 30th, or theFriday preceding if such date falls on a Saturday or Sunday.

往後幾年Berkshire將會因這項捐款計劃獲得些許的稅負抵減,而每年10月10日以前,我們將會通知股東每股可捐贈的金額,你有三個禮拜的時間可以作決定,為免喪失資格,股份須確實由你本人名義登記。

Our only disappointment with this program in 1981 was that some of our shareholders, through no fault of their own, missed the opportunity to participate. The Treasury Department ruling allowing us to proceed without tax uncertainty was received early in October. The ruling did not cover participation by shareholders whose stock was registered in the name of nominees, such as brokers, and additionally required that the owners of all designating shares make certain assurances to Berkshire . These assurances could not be given us in effective form by nominee holders.

對於去年這項計劃我們惟一感到遺憾的是,有些股東雖然不是因為本身的錯誤,而無法參加,由於稅務單位的解釋令於10月初才下來,並規定股份若由代理人或經紀人名義登記者不適用。

Under these circumstances, we attempted to communicate with all of our owners promptly (via the October 14th letter) so that, if they wished, they could prepare themselves to participate by the November 13th record date. It was particularly important that this information be communicated promptly to stockholders whose holdings were in nominee name, since they would not be eligible unless they took action to re-register their shares before the record date.

在這樣的情況下,我們試著與所有的股東立即連絡(透過10月14號的那封信),好讓他們有機會可以趕上11月13號的過戶截止日,這對那些非以自己名義持有股份的股東來說尤其重要,因為如非他們及時採取正名的動作,否則將因此喪失應享的權利。

Unfortunately, communication to such non-record shareholders could take place only through the nominees. We therefore strongly urged those nominees, mostly brokerage houses, to promptly transmit our letter to the real owners. We explained that their failure to do so could deprive such owners of an important benefit.

由於時間緊迫,再加上聯絡前述股東仍須透過其代理人,使得部份股東沒能參加,在此我們強烈呼籲那些股票經紀人儘速通知其客戶,以免股東的權利被剝奪。

The results from our urgings would not strengthen the case for private ownership of the U.S. Postal Service. Many of our shareholders never heard from their brokers (as some shareholders told us after reading news accounts of the program). Others were forwarded our letter too late for action.

我們再三敦促的結果並無法讓美國郵政加強,很多我們股東的營業員從來就沒有告訴其客戶這件消息(有許多股東表示他們是在看到了相關新聞才知道這項計畫),有的則是在過期後才拿到相關通知。

One of the largest brokerage houses claiming to hold stock for sixty of its clients (about 4% of our shareholder population), apparently transmitted our letter about three weeks after receipt - too late for any of the sixty to participate. (Such lassitude did not pervade all departments of that firm; it billed Berkshire for mailing services within six days of that belated and ineffectual action.)

其中有家證券經紀商代表60位股東(約佔4%強股權)很明顯地在接到郵件三個禮拜後,才將之轉到客戶的手上。諷刺的是,該公司並非所有部門皆如此懶散,轉寄郵件的帳單在六天內就送到Berkshire公司。

We recite such horror stories for two reasons: (1) if you wish to participate in future designated contribution programs, be sure to have your stock registered in your name well before September 30th; and (2) even if you don’t care to participate and prefer to leave your stock in nominee form, it would be wise to have at least one share registered in your own name. By so doing, you can be sure that you will be notified of any important corporate news at the same time as all other shareholders.

我們之所以告訴大家這件事有兩個理由(1)若你希望參加這項股東指定捐贈計劃的話,請務必將你的股份在九月底以前改登記在自己的名下(2)就算你不想參加,最好還是至少將一股登記在自己的名下,如此才能確保你與其他股東一樣在第一時間知道有關公司的重大消息。

The designated-contributions idea, along with many other ideas that have turned out well for us, was conceived by Charlie Munger, Vice Chairman of Berkshire and Chairman of Blue Chip. Irrespective of titles, Charlie and I work as partners in managing all controlled companies. To almost a sinful degree, we enjoy our work as managing partners. And we enjoy having you as our financial partners.

最後包含這項股東指定捐贈計劃在內的許多很好的idea,都是由Berkshire公司的副董事長兼Blue Chip的董事長Charlie Minger所構思,不管職稱為何,Charlie 跟我皆以執行合夥人的心態管理所有事業,而各位股東就像是我們一般的合夥人一樣。

Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board

華倫.巴菲特
董事會主席

REF:http://tw.myblog.yahoo.com/hermayler-101/article?mid=244&next=243&l=f&fid=5
http://tw.myblog.yahoo.com/hermayler-101/article?mid=243&prev=244&next=242&l=f&fid=5
http://tw.myblog.yahoo.com/hermayler-101/article?mid=242&prev=243&next=238&l=f&fid=5

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統一超 報價(2912) 最近胡亂炒作股 台灣最大連鎖便利商店 零售
誠品生活 報價(2926) 有品味股 亞洲最佳的連鎖書店 零售
詩肯 報價(6196) 沒意見股 柚木家具組品牌公司 零售
F-東凌 報價(2924) 跟投資創業公司一樣股 中國童裝及嬰童用品品牌公司 零售
特力 報價(2908) 很多年都沒動股 家居與修繕DIY 零售
F-台南 報價(5706) 跟投資創業公司一樣股 中國高級男裝brand 零售
全家 報價(5903) 最近胡亂炒作股 台灣第2大便利商店 零售
遠百 報價(2903) 沒意見股 台灣三大百貨零售業 零售
潤泰全 報價(2915) 最近胡亂炒作股 零售跟紡織等綜合企業 零售
麗嬰房 報價(2911) 沒意見股 台灣的品牌嬰幼兒商品零售商 零售
益航 報價(2601) 定時炒作百貨股 中國大洋百貨與航運公司 零售
寶島科 報價(5312) 沒意見股 台灣最大的零售眼鏡公司 零售
大聯大 報價(3702) 三不五時就併購股 亞太第一大專業零組件通路 通路
茂訊 報價(3213) 冷到不行股 特殊用途電腦製造商 通路
震旦行 報價(2373) 沒意見股 辦公設備和辦公家具 通路
神腦 報價(2450) 最近胡亂炒作股 台灣3C通路 通路
藍天 報價(2362) 轉雞股 通路 通路
聯強 報價(2347) 沒意見股 亞洲最大的電子3C通路商 通路
川湖 報價(2095) 沒意見股 導軌與滑軌公司 零件
正崴 報價(2392) 4年炒一次鴻海概念股 連接器元件企業 零件
晶技 報價(3042) 時間到一定會有的概念股 全球前5大石英元件廠商 零件
景碩 報價(3189) 還ok 全球手機晶片載板的龍頭企業 零件
台達電 報價(2308) 股價跟烏龜一樣慢動的股 電源供應器的大廠 零件
鴻海 報價(2317) 郭董一跳舞股價就跌,擦手帕的汗就漲 EMS電子代工 組裝
華碩 報價(2357) 一直都不動股 NB品牌 NB
廣達 報價(2382) 老闆時常生氣股 NB代工 NB
系微 報價(6231) 還不錯的公司 BIOS軟體公司 NB
可成 報價(2474) 沒意見股 鋁鎂合金成型公司 NB
新普 報價(6121) 還ok股 筆電鋰電池的製造 NB
宏碁 報價(2353) 最近跌一跤股 筆電品牌 NB
曜亞 報價(4138) 沒意見 美容儀器代理與銷售公司

醫藥

五鼎 報價(1733) 安安靜靜賺錢股 血糖測儀器和檢測試片公司

醫藥

F-康聯 報價(4144) 跟投資創業公司一樣股 中國醫藥服務與行銷公司 醫藥
台耀 報價(4746) 沒意見股 防曬原料藥製造商 醫藥
F-馬光 報價(4139) 千里迢迢不知道來台灣做蝦咪掛牌股 新加坡連鎖中醫公司 醫藥
精華 報價(1565) 小鋼炮股 全球第5大隱形眼鏡公司 醫藥
F- 金可 報價(8406) 才剛上櫃股 中國最大隱形眼鏡公司 醫藥
訊聯 報價(1784) 跟投資創業公司一樣股 臍帶血銀行 醫藥
盛弘醫藥 報價(8403) 跟投資創業公司一樣股 醫藥通路 醫藥
研勤 報價(3632) 有勇氣創立品牌股 GPS導航軟體與品牌企業 通訊
F-TPK 報價(3673) 沒意見股 全球電容觸控模組龍頭 通訊
大立光 報價(3008) 一直都是績優股 手機鏡頭設計及製造 通訊
網家 報價(8044) 乘風破浪股 電子商務 網路
商店街 報價(4965) 乘風破浪股 B2B2C的網路電子商務公司 網路
104 報價(3130) 一直沒動股 台灣最大的網路求職網站 網路
茂順 報價(9942) 冷門股 油封企業 汽車
大車隊 報價(2640) 傳統股 呼叫計程車服務 汽車
裕融 報價(9941) 有機會股 汽車貸款公司 汽車
中橡 報價(2104) 傳統股 碳煙、蒸汽的製造與買賣 汽車
正新輪胎 報價(2105) 安安靜靜股 全球十大輪胎品牌 汽車
新焦點 報價(9106),0360.HK 跟投資創業公司一樣股 中國汽車美容的龍頭公司 汽車
上銀 報價(2049) 最近很紅股 全球第三大滾珠螺桿、線性滑軌公司 工具機
友佳 報價(912398),02398.HK 都沒人理股 中國CNC工具機龍頭 工具機
F-亞德 報價(1590) 很少聽過股 氣動處理元件領導廠商 工具機
F-再生

報價(1337)

跟投資創業公司一樣股 中國最大EVA發泡產品公司 化工
中碳 報價(1723) 超級績優股 煤化學製品公司 化工
台塑 報價(1301) 唯一推薦你養老股 台灣最大的綜合塑化企業 化工
台肥 報價(1722) 每年都炒地產題材股 台灣最大的肥料公司 化工
永記 報價(1726) 安安靜靜吃股 油漆與塗料工程企業 化工
蒙恬 報價(5211) 沒意見股 人機介面軟體企業 軟體
遊戲橘子 報價(6180) 沒意見股 遊戲代理與自製開發公司 軟體
中華電信 報價(2412) 4年炒作一次股 台灣最大的電信綜和營運商 電信
台積電 報價(2330) 燕子來時就跌股 全球晶片晶圓代工的龍頭 晶圓
久元 報價(6261) 收費站公司 切割挑揀與測試公司 封測
力成 報價(6239) 小鋼炮股 記憶體封測 封測
巨路 報價(6192) 冷門股 程控企業 電腦
飛捷 報價(6206) 冷門股一支 POS企業 電腦
研華 報價(2395) 還ok股 全球工業電腦領導企業 電腦
中鋼 報價(2002) 猴子也能經營股 台灣最大的鋼鐵企業 鋼鐵
健鼎 報價(3044) 沒意見股 PCB公司 PCB
信義房屋 報價(9940) 老闆不錯股 房屋仲介公司 房屋
巨大 報價(9921) 老板環島就跌股,在家就漲股 腳踏車品牌公司 腳踏車
晶華酒店 報價(2707) 有品股 商務與旅行酒店 飯店
可寧衛 報價(8422) 等幾年看看股 固化廢棄物處理掩埋公司 環保
中宇環保 報價(8422) 有母公司罩的股 環保工程公司 環保
台橡 報價(2103) 績優股 合成橡膠 汽車
中興保全 報價(9917) 都沒再動股 台灣最大的綜合保全公司 保全
友達 報價(2409) 時常轉虧為盈股 面板製造 面板
琉園 報價(9949) 沒人理股 琉璃藝術企業 玻璃
陞泰 報價(8072) 還ok股 安全監控企業 保全
鳳凰 報價(5706) 老闆文筆不錯股 綜合旅行社 旅行
台泥 報價(1101) 景氣循環股 台灣龍頭水泥企業 水泥
茂迪 報價(6244) 打爛仗股 太陽能電池 太陽能
佳龍 報價(9955) 沒意見股 電子廢棄物回收的環保企業 環保
揚子江 報價(911609),BS6 沒意見股 民營造船企業 航運
四維航業 報價(5608) 景氣循環股 散裝航運企業 航運
晶電 報價(2488) 沒意見股 LED磊晶晶粒 LED
耕興 報價(6146) 收費站型公司股 電磁相容EMC測試 EMC
宏達電 報價(2498) 台灣民族英雄股 Smart phone品牌 手機
禾伸堂 報價(3026) 末升段炒作股 被動元件公司 零組件
F-中租 報價(5871) 跟投資創業公司一樣股 租任與貸款 金融業
F-紅木 報價(8426) 跟投資創業公司一樣股 精品名牌店之裝潢公司 奢持
神州數碼 報價(910861) 穩定公司 IT分銷與solution IT

香港/中國股市

周生生 00116 龜速布局中國股 時尚珠寶金飾的零售業 奢侈品
周大福珠寶 01929 衝很快股 亞洲最大的珠寶連鎖公司 奢侈品
亨得利 03389 安安靜靜股 大型零售名錶企業 奢侈品
Prada 01913 千里迢迢來中國撈金股 全球經典時尚品牌企業 奢侈品
Coach 06388 來撈金股 美國手袋品牌 奢侈品
九興控股 01836 默默辛苦工作股 精品鞋代工與品牌公司 奢侈品
米蘭站 01150 包二奶專用股 二手名牌包包零售店 奢侈品
神冠控股 01913 天知道腸衣可以這樣賺股 香腸腸衣(外皮)的企業 食品飲料
阜豐集團 00546 看來一直都低估股 中國最大的味精生產商 食品飲料
統一企業中國 00220 跟康師父PK股 中國食品飲料列強企業 食品飲料
青島啤酒 0168,600600 養老股 百年歷史的啤酒 食品飲料
華寶國際 00336 主席一直出貨股 香料香精的龍頭企業 食品飲料
張裕 200869,000869 養老股 亞洲最大的葡萄酒公司 食品飲料
旺旺 0151 一直不修正股 米果與食品企業 食品飲料
康師傅 00322 養老股 中國方便麵與茶飲料公司 食品飲料
貴州茅台 600519 賄絡專用股 醬香型的中國國酒 食品飲料
西藏5100 01115 跟投資創業公司一樣股 中國高端瓶裝礦泉水企業 食品飲料
雨潤食品 01068 主席投資太多股 中國領先肉製品公司 食品飲料
中國食品 00506 國家隊股 食品飲料製造 食品飲料
中國糧油控股 00606 一手包股 農產品加工企業 食品飲料
天福茗茶 6868 定存股 世界茶王 食品飲料
克莉絲汀 01210 跟投資創業公司一樣股 連鎖烘培公司企業 食品飲料
莎莎國際 00178 布局中國完整股 亞洲最大的化粧品連鎖店 零售
華潤創業 00291 穩定股 超市與食品飲料綜合企業 零售
佐丹奴 00709 積極布局中國股 平價服飾 零售
聯華超市 00980 盤據上海股 超市零售 零售
高鑫零售 06808 Walmart 靠邊站股 中國大賣場龍頭 零售
波司登 03998 沒意見股 中國最大的羽絨服企業 零售
達芙妮 00210 還ok股 中國品牌女鞋銷量第一企業 零售
小肥羊 00968 還不知道可以被併購股 著名羊肉火鍋連鎖餐廳 餐飲連鎖
味千中国 00538 最近亂搞股 日式拉麵連鎖 餐飲連鎖
全聚德 002186 擴張到後面還是靠一家賺股 中華老字號的烤鴨店 餐飲連鎖
大家樂 00341 布局中國龜速股 全球最大的中式連鎖餐飲集團 餐飲連鎖
上海醫藥 02607,601607 好股 中國領先綜合醫藥公司 醫藥
國藥控股 01099 會有一段好光景股 中國最大的醫藥分銷商 醫藥
同仁堂科 01666 沒有定位清楚的定存股 中醫龍頭同仁堂的子公司 醫藥
四環醫藥 00460 沒意見股 中國最大的心腦血管藥物企業 醫藥
微創 00853 競爭激烈股 中國最大的心血管支架企業 醫藥
創生 00325 沒意見股 中國創傷骨科產品領先企業 醫藥
廣州藥業 00807,600332 穩定股 中成藥 醫藥
騰訊控股 00700 無惡不作股 即時通訊與社群網 網路
世紀佳緣 DATE 沒意見股 交友與婚姻網站 網路
人人網 RENN 天曉得何時賺錢股 中國最大的社群網站之一 網路
優酷網 YOKU 天曉得何時賺錢股 中國最大的影音網站之一 網路
攜程 CTRP 還不錯股 綜合性網路旅行服務公司 網路
阿里巴巴 01688 老闆是教宗,常常佈道股 B2B網路公司 網路
百度 BIDU 壟斷股 中國最大網路搜尋引擎 網路
恆安國際 01044 意外漲很多倍股 衛生護理用品公司 消費
敏華 01999 還ok股 休閒沙發品牌與製造企業 消費
L’Occitane 0973 來賺中國錢股 源自普羅旺斯天然化妝品護理企業 消費
新秀麗 01910 跟投資創業公司一樣股 全球最大的旅遊行李箱公司 消費
金沙中國 01928 還不錯股 紙醉金迷的賭博與娛樂公司 賭博
自然美 00157 沒意見股 美容護膚SPA的連鎖企業 消費
金風 2208,2202 殺紅了眼股 中國風力發電設備商 能源
亞洲果業 00073 沒意見股 鮮橙(柳丁)種植公司 農業
Glencore 00805 壟斷股 全球商品原物料貿易王者 貿易
中石油 857,601857,PTR 國家隊股 中國最大的綜合石油企業 能源
中國南車 1766,601766 最近出包公司股 中國最大軌道交通裝備企業 運輸
現代教育 01082 靠人吃飯公司 香港中學補習班 教育
首都機場 00694 收費站公司 北京飛機機場企業 公用事業
中國移動 941,CHL 養老股一支 中國最大的移動電信商 電信
淡水河谷 06210 每年讓大陸政府頭痛的公司 全球3大鐵礦石企業之一 鋼鐵
中國航信 00696 收費站公司 航空訊息服務 公用事業
黃山 900942,600054 收費站公司 名列世界遺產中國名山管理公司 旅行
惠理基金 00086 看人吃飯的行業 價值投資的亞洲基金 金融
港交所 00388 收費站公司 香港交易所 金融
靄華押業信貸 01319 賺窮人錢公司 香港最大典當公司 金融
電視廣播TVB 0511 穩定的行業 電視廣播 傳媒
壹傳媒 00282 辛苦的行業 周刊與報紙傳媒公司 傳媒
亞洲水泥中國 00743 景氣循環股 水泥製品 水泥
台泥國際 01136 景氣循環股 中國領先的水泥大廠之一 水泥
比亞迪 01211 有munger加持 鋰鎳電池與電動汽車的企業 汽車
新焦點 0360 跟投資創業公司一樣 汽車美容的龍頭公司 汽車
富士康 02038 郭董用手帕擦汗他就跌 手機EMS代工企業 手機
神州數碼 報價(00861) 穩定公司 IT分銷與solution IT