Mungerisms (孟格主義)

(1)”Most people are too fretful, they worry to much.  Success means being very patient, but aggressive when it’s time.”
大部分的人都太浮躁了,它們擔心過多.成功其實意味著當機會來時你要積極

(2)”Using [a stock’s] volatility as a measure of risk is nuts. Risk to us is 1) the risk of permanent loss of capital, or 2) the risk of inadequate return. Some great businesses have very volatile returns – for example, See’s [a candy company owned by Berkshire] usually loses money in two quarters of each year – and some terrible businesses can have steady results.”

用股價波動性來衡量風險的是傻子.所謂風險就是(1)資金永久的損失,(2)不足的回報.例如我們擁有的巧克力公司candy,它在一年中的兩個淡季是虧損的.反之還有一些爛公司是穩定的

(3)”I think that, every time you saw the word EBITDA [earnings], you should substitute the word “bullshit” earnings.”

EBITDA是狗屎
 
(4)“Warren talks about these discounted cash flows. I’ve never seen him do one.” ”It’s true,” replied Buffett. “If the value of a company doesn’t just scream out at you, it’s too close.”

我不曾看看過巴菲特用計算機去算現金流折現,如果公司價值需要你這樣價值,那價值跟價格就太接近了

(5)”If you buy something because it’s undervalued, then you have to think about selling it when it approaches your calculation of its intrinsic value. That’s hard. But if you buy a few great companies, then you can sit on your ass. That’s a good thing.”

如果你買低估的公司,然後試圖在它合理的價格賣出,這太難了!!還不如你買下偉大的公司,然後坐著等它成長

(6)”We bought a doomed textile mill [Berkshire Hathaway] and a California S&L [Wesco] just before a calamity. Both were bought at a discount to liquidation value.”

我們買了帶給我們兩個災難公司,一個是紡織廠Berkshire Hathaway,一個是存貸公司Wesco,可悲的是我們是用"清算價值"買的..

(7)”For society, the Internet is wonderful, but for capitalists, it will be a net negative. It will increase efficiency, but lots of things increase efficiency without increasing profits. It is way more likely to make American businesses less profitable than more profitable.  This is perfectly obvious, but very little understood.”

對社會來說,網路是美好的,可是對資本家來說,它是負面的.雖然它增加了效率,卻減少了美國商業的獲利,很明顯的很少人理解..


(8)”Virtually every investment expert’s public assessment is that he is above average, no matter what is the evidence to the contrary.”

大眾評價投資專家通常是高於水平的,雖然這跟事實相反

(9)”Investing is where you find a few great companies and then sit on your ass.”

投資就是買下偉大的公司,然後等它成長

(10)”Warren spends 70 hours a week thinking about investing .”

巴菲特一周花70小時思考投資

(11)”People calculate too much and think too little.”

人們計算的太多,卻思考的太少

(12)”Whenever you think something or some person is ruining your life, it’s you. A victimization mentality is so debilitating.”

如果你在想是哪個人摧毀你的生活,那其實是你自己,受害者的心智只會弱化它自己..

(13)”The tax code gives you an enormous advantage if you can find some things you can just sit with.”

稅法決定了買好公司長期投資的優勢

(14)”If you’re going to buy something which compounds for 30 years at 15% per annum and you pay one 35% tax at the very end, the way that works out is that after taxes, you keep 13.3% per annum.  In contrast, if you bought the same investment, but had to pay taxes every year of 35% out of the 15% that you earned, then your return would be 15% minus 35% of 15%—or only 9.75% per year compounded. So the difference there is over 3.5%. And what 3.5% does to the numbers over long holding periods like 30 years is truly eye-opening…”

如果你買了一家每年以15%報酬持續30年的公司,在最後一年.你付了35%獲利了結, 你的報酬是13.5%.反之,如果你每買了這家公司,30年間不斷的每年獲利了結,並付上35%的稅,你最後的報酬是9.75%,雖然只有3.5%的差異,但拉長30年可是大的要命

(15)”The number one idea, is to view a stock as an ownership of the business [and] to judge the staying quality of the business in terms of its competitive advantage. Look for more value in terms of discounted future cash flow than you’re paying for. Move only when you have an advantage. It’s very basic. You have to understand the odds and have the discipline to bet only when the odds are in your favor.”

最重要的想法是把股票視為一家公司,並且判斷一家公司的競爭優勢.用現金流折現概念去看你願意支付的價格,當機率站在你這邊時就下去賭.

(16)”Failure to handle psychological denial is a common way for people to go broke. You’ve made an enormous commitment to something.You’ve poured effort and money in.  And the more you put in, the more that the whole consistency principle makes you think,” Now it has to work. If I put in just a little more, then it ’all work…. People go broke that way —because they can ’t stop,rethink,and say,’ I can afford to write this one off and live to fight again.  I don’t have to pursue this thing as an obsession —in a way that will break me .’ “

無法控制心智上的困頓是人們破產原因之一.一個人已經付出巨大的心力和金錢,當你付出愈多時,你的心裡就會想"只要在付出一點就會成功了.....人們就是這樣破產的,因為它不會重新思考"重新再來.沒必要讓這件事形成阻礙 -- 讓我受到傷害


(17)”…in terms of business mistakes that I’ve seen over a long lifetime, I would say that trying to minimize taxes too much is one of the great standard causes of really dumb mistakes. I see terrible mistakes from people being overly motivated by tax considerations. Warren and I personally don’t drill oil wells. We pay our taxes. And we’ve done pretty well, so far. Anytime somebody offers you a tax shelter from here on in life, my advice would be don’t buy it.”

細想我們做生意犯的錯誤中,我會說:過度避稅的一件很明顯的錯誤.我曾看見些人因為過度避稅而產生錯誤,巴菲特和我不是挖油的.我們正常繳稅,而且感覺良好.如果有人推銷避稅套餐,請記得"別買"

(18)”I believe that we are at or near the apex of a great civilization….In 50-100 years, if we’re a poor third to some countries in Asia, I wouldn’t be surprised. If I had to bet, the part of the world that will do best will be Asia.”

我相信我們正在處於文明的頂點...在50-100年之後,如果比亞洲國家還窮1/3,我不會感到意外.如果要賭,我賭亞洲會變成最好的

(19)”To some extent, stocks are like Rembrandts. They sell based on what they’ve sold in the past. Bonds are much more rational. No-one thinks a bond’s value will soar to the moon.” “Imagine if every pension fund in America bought Rembrandts. Their value would go up and they would create their own constituency.”

在麼些層次來說.股票像Rembrandts的畫,它們賣出價是基於過去曾經賣出的價格.債卷則是較理性,沒人會認為債卷會長到天上去.想像一下美國的所有的退休基金都拿去買Rembrandts的畫,他的畫會長到不可思議,而且最終它還會有一群擁護者

(20)”It’s crazy to assume that what’s happening in Argentina and Japan is inconceivable here.”

假設阿根廷跟日本的情形不會出現在美國是不可思議的

(21)”REITs are way more suitable for individual shareholders than for corporate shareholders. And Warren has enough residue from his old cigar-butt personality that when people became disenchanted with the REITs and the market price went down to maybe a 20% discount from what the companies could be liquidated for, he bought a few shares with his personal money. So it’s nice that Warren has a few private assets with which to pick up cigar butts in memory of old times – if that’s what keeps him amused.”

REITs比起機構投資人還來說更適合一般投資人,巴菲特還殘留著雪茄屁股式的投資REITs,尤其當它折價20%人們卻逃避時.它用個人的私房錢去投資來回味以前的投資愉快時光

(22)”Smart people aren’t exempt from professional disasters from overconfidence. Often, they just run aground in the more difficult voyages they choose, relying on their self-appraisals that they have superior talents and methods.”

聰明的人無法避免過度自信,通常它們會試圖去挑戰困難的東西,而這些高度仰賴於才能跟方法

(23)”The whole concept of the house advantage is an interesting one in modern money management. The terms of the managers of the private partnerships look a lot like the take of the croupier at Monte Carlo, only greater.”

莊家優勢在金錢管理行業是一個有趣的東西.投資經理就像一個在Monte Cario賭場的莊家,只是規模比較大罷了

(24)”There are always  people who will be better at some thing than you are.You have to learn to be a follower before you become a leader.”

總是有人比你還優秀,所以在成為領導者之前,請先當個追隨者

(25)”We all are learning, modifying, or destroying ideas all the time. Rapid destruction of your ideas when the time is right is one of the most valuable qualities you can acquire. You must force yourself to consider arguments on the other side. If you can’t state arguments against what you believe better than your detractors, you don’t know enough.”

我們無時無刻在學習,修正與顛覆我們的想法.在適當的時間快速修正自己的想法是一個有價值的個性.你必須要站在反向來思考,如果你不能從反方來思考,代表你做得不夠..

(26) “I remember the $0.05 hamburger and a $0.40-per-hour minimum wage, so I’ve seen a tremendous amount of inflation in my lifetime. Did it ruin the investment climate? I think not.”

我記得漢堡一個0.05元,最低薪水每小時0.4元.我曾經歷過巨大的通澎.那這有破壞投資??我不認為

(27)”A lot of success in life and business comes from knowing what you want to avoid: early death, a bad marriage, etc.”

生命跟商業的成功來自於幣面你應該避免的東西...如早死或是差勁的婚姻

(28)”There are two types of mistakes: 1) doing nothing[We saw it, but didn’t act on it]; what Warren calls “sucking my thumb” and 2) buying with an eyedropper things we should be buying a lot of.”

有兩種錯誤,一種是沒做任何事(看見了卻沒做任何動作,巴菲特說:這在吸指甲).另一種是該大買時,我們卻只買一點

(29)”Checklist routines avoid a lot of errors. You should have all of this elementary wisdom, and you should go through a mental checklist in order to use it. There is no other procedure that will work as well.”

經常性的檢查清單能夠減少錯誤.你該擁有這基礎的智慧而且也善用心智清單.

(30)”Litigation is notoriously time-consuming, inefficient, costly and unpredictable.”

打官司是有名的耗時,沒效率,價格昂貴和不可預測的

(31)”Finding a single investment that will return 20% per year for 40 years tends to happen only in dreamland. In the real world, you uncover an opportunity, and then you compare other opportunities with that. And you only invest in the most attractive opportunities. That’s your opportunity cost. That’s what you learn in freshman economics. The game hasn’t changed at all. That’s why Modern Portfolio Theory is so asinine.”

只有在夢幻島才能找到單筆投資在40年以內以每年20%的報酬獲利.你必須尋找機會,並且加以比較,然後投資那些較吸引你的投資機會,這就是機會成本,這也是初階經濟學學的.這遊戲現在依舊沒變.所以我才稱現代投資理論是蠢蛋

(32)”The more hard lessons you can learn vicariously rather than through your own hard experience, the better.” “Well, some of our success we predicted and some of it was fortuitous.”

你最好從別人失敗的經驗去學習,而不是經過自己的經驗.我們成功是可以預測的,當然有一部分是意外

(33)”The general assumption is that it must be easy to sit behind a desk and people will bring in one good opportunity after another — this was the attitude in venture capital until a few years ago. This was not the case at all for us — we scrounged around for companies to buy. For 20 years, we didn’t buy more than one or two per year. …It’s fair to say that we were rooting around. There were no commissioned salesmen. Anytime you sit there waiting for a deal to come by, you’re in a very dangerous seat.”

風投界幾年前就坐在椅子等別人帶來機會給它,對我們來說不是這樣的,我們到處找我們要買的公司,我們一年頂多買1或是2家...誠實的說我們已經挖到底部了,感覺就像一個沒傭金的銷售員.如果你坐在椅子等待機會,我認為你就很危險..

(34)”Our biggest mistakes, were things we didn’t do, companies we didn’t buy.”

我們最大的錯誤來自於該做的事沒做,該買的公司沒買

(35)”You can progress only when you learn the method of learning.”

只有學習"如何學習"才會更進步

(36)”It is remarkable how much long-term advantage people like us have gotten by trying to be consistently not stupid, instead of trying to be very intelligent.”

我們長期的優勢在於盡量不幹蠢事,而不是試圖讓自己更有智慧

(37)”Berkshire’s past record has been almost ridiculous. If Berkshire had used even half the leverage of, say, Rupert Murdoch, it would be five times its current size.”

波克夏的紀錄輝煌的可以.如果波克夏願意加大槓桿1/2.如Rupert Murdoch.現在可能變成原本的5倍大..

(38)”It took us months of buying all the Coke stock we could to accumulate $1 billion worth — equal to 7% of the company. It’s very hard to accumulate major positions.”

當主要股東是很難的,我們花幾個裕的時間才買進可口可樂約10億的部位,約7%公司的持股.

(39)”All large aggregations of capital eventually find it hell on earth to grow and thus find a lower rate of return”

所有大資金部位的投資人,無可避面的競爭造成只剩下低報酬的機會可以尋找..

(40)”If you have only a little capital and are young today, there are fewer opportunities than when I was young. Back then, we had just come out of a depression. Capitalism was a bad word. There had been abuses in the 1920s. A joke going around then was the guy who said, ‘I bought stock for my old age and it worked — in six months, I feel like an old man!’ “It’s tougher for you, but that doesn’t mean you won’t do well — it just may take more time. But what the heck, you may live longer.”

如果你現在年輕又擁有小資金,你的機會比我那時還少,我們剛好遠離大蕭條.那時資本主義是一個差勁的字眼,尤其在1920年代.一個笑話是這樣說的:我買股票幫我養老,真的,6個月以後成真了,我變老頭子了.....這不代表你會做得不好,只是這會花你很久時間,你必須要活更久ㄋ


(41)”Regarding the demographic trend called Baby Boomers, it’s peanuts compared to the trend of economic growth.  Over the last century, [our] GNP is up seven times.  This was not caused by Baby Boomers, but by the general success of capitalism and the march of technology.  Those trends were so favorable that little blips in the birth rate were not that significant.  We can keep social peace as long as GNP rises 3% annually – this can pay for spending by politicians.  If we ever got to stasis [no growth], then with all the promises, you’d get real tensions between the generations.  The Baby Boomers would exacerbate it, but the real cause would be lack of growth.”

嬰兒潮對經濟成長來說影響是很小的,在上個世紀,我們的GNP成長了7倍.這不是幼嬰兒潮所引起的,而是資本主義跟科技的進步.我們可以讓社會保持和平,只要我們的GNP每年成長3% ...這可以支付政客所帶來的浪費.如果我們停止了增長,緊張關係就會在幾代之間產生.嬰兒潮只是加劇而已,最根本原因還是缺乏經濟成長

(42)”Practically everybody overweighs the stuff that can be numbered, because it yields to the statistical techniques they’re taught in academia, and doesn’t mix in the hard-to-measure stuff that may be more important. That is a mistake I’ve tried all my life to avoid, and I have no regrets for having done that.”

實際來說,人對量化的東西過於關注了.有部分原因是因為學校教他這樣做的,有時不可量化的東西更為重要,這是我試著要去免犯的錯誤之一.

(43)”You must know the big ideas in the big disciplines, and use them routinely — all of them, not just a few. Most people are trained in one model — economics, for example — and try to solve all problems in one way. You know the old saying: to the man with a hammer, the world looks like a nail. This is a dumb way of handling problems.”

你必須理解各個領域的大道理,並且常常使用它...這些道理不多.大部分的人只會單向思考 -- 如經濟思維,而且只用一種方式解決問題,這就像一個拿著棒槌的人,把所有東西都視為釘子,這一種很白癡的做法

(44)”The whole concept of dividing it up into ‘value’ and ‘growth’ strikes me as twaddle. It’s convenient for a bunch of pension fund consultants to get fees prattling about and a way for one advisor to distinguish himself from another. But, to me, all intelligent investing is value investing.”

把投資區分為價值跟成長投資是一種廢話.對那些基金管理人來說談論或是區隔這些這些讓它看起來更為專業.對我來說,所有有智慧的投資都是價值投資

(45)”In my whole life, I have known no wise people who didn’t read all the time – none, zero. You’d be amazed at how much Warren reads, at how much I read. My children laugh at me. They think I’m a book with a couple of legs sticking out.”

在我整個生涯中,我們沒有聽過哪個聰明的人不是大量閱讀的 -- 一個也沒有.你會對巴菲特閱讀多少而吃驚的,我大概也是.我的小孩稱我為會有兩條腿的書

(46)”We read a lot.  I don’t know anyone who’s wise who doesn’t read a lot.  But that’s not enough: You have to have a temperament to grab ideas and do sensible things.  Most people don’t grab the right ideas or don’t know what to do with them.”

我們閱讀很多,聰明的人都閱讀很多.但這還不夠,你必須要抓住一些重要的想法,感知一些事.大部分的人都不知道重點在哪,更別說更進一步..

(47)”We get these questions a lot from the enterprising young. It’s a very intelligent question: You look at some old guy who’s rich and you ask, ‘How can I become like you, except faster?”

我們時常被一些進取的年輕人問.這些問題都是相當的聰明:你這樣有錢,我該如何快速成為你ㄋ??

(48)”It takes almost no capital to open a new See’s candy store. We’re drowning in capital of our own that has almost no cost. It would be crazy to franchise stores like some capital-starved pancake house. We like owning our own stores as a matter of quality control”

去開一新的巧克力See's candy是幾乎不需要資本的.我們已經被充滿無成本的資金淹沒了.對於煎餅店這種缺乏資金的商店做這種事是瘋狂的.況且我們喜歡做直營來控制品質

(49)”It’s dangerous to short stocks.”

放空是危險的

(50)”Being short and seeing a promoter take the stock up is very irritating. It’s not worth it to have that much irritation in your life.”

當你成為一個放空的人卻發現股價因為催化劑而上升是憤怒的.那是不值得的,讓憤怒充滿你的生活

(51)”It would be one of the most irritating experiences in the world to do a lot of work to uncover a fraud and then at have it go from X to 3X and and have the crooks happily partying with your money while you’re meeting margin calls. Why would you want to go within hailing distance of that?”

最洩氣的經驗是,你做了很多功課發現騙局.你放空它,結果股價卻漲了3倍.而這些騙子卻快樂的享用你輸的錢,而且你還需要被補繳保證金的電話煩.這樣的事哪裡找ㄋ　

(52)”…the cost of being a publicly traded stock has gone way, way up. It doesn’t make sense for a little company to be public anymore. A lot of little companies are going private to be rid of these burdensome requirements….”

上市的代價太高了.對於小公司來說上是不再有其優勢,私有化反而能減少這些煩惱

(53)”Well the open-outcry auction is just made to turn the brain into us mush: you’ve got social proof, the other guy is bidding, you get reciprocation tendency, you get deprival super-reaction syndrome, the thing is going away… I mean it just absolutely is designed to manipulate people into idiotic behavior.”

公開競價只會讓頭腦變成一坨粥.你會因為別人競價而得到社會認同,你得到了反饋的趨勢.你也得到了超級剝奪症候群....我的意思這是設計去操縱人去變白癡的一種制度

(54)”The problem with closed bid auctions is that they are frequently won by people making a technical mistake, as in the case with Shell paying double for Belridge Oil. You can’t pay double the losing bid in an open outcry auction.”

暗箱競價常常讓那些贏得競標的人犯技術上的錯誤,如Shell石油支付兩倍的錢給Belridge石油.在公開競價這是不可能發生的

(55)”We’re partial to putting out large amounts of money where we won’t have to make another decision.”

我們把我們的錢放在那些不需要再做其它決策的投資上

(56)”Understanding how to be a good investor makes you a better business manager and vice versa.”

理解如何成為一個好的投資人讓你成為一個好的商業管理人,反之亦同

(57)”What’s fascinating . . .is that you could now have a business that might have been selling for $10 billion where the business itself could probably not have borrowed even $100 million. But the owners of that business, because its public, could borrow many billions of dollars on their little pieces of paper- because they had these market valuations. But as a private business, the company itself couldn’t borrow even 1/20th of what the individuals could borrow.”

有趣的是....你可以擁有10億元的公司,而這些公司可能沒辦法借到一億元.但當公司上市以後,你卻可以用你的股票質押去借幾十億美金.如果你不是上市公司,你卻只能借到約1/20...

(58)”I constantly see people rise in life who are not the smartest – sometimes not even the most diligent. But they are learning machines; they go to bed every night a little wiser than when they got up. And, boy, does that habit help, particularly when you have a long run ahead of you.”

我經常看見那些不是很聰明有勤奮的人卻能很成功.但它們都是學習機器,它們每天起床都希望比昨天更聰明一些.如果你有一段很長的一段路要走,請把這當作習慣..

(59)”The basic concept of value to a private owner and being motivated when you’re buying and selling securities by reference to intrinsic value instead of price momentum – I don’t think that will ever be outdated.”

不管是私人擁有的企業或是上市公司,你買賣都需要依照公司的價值來行動,而不是浮動的股價　--　這永不過時

(60)”Warren and I have not made our way in life by making successful macroeconomic predictions and betting on our conclusions.”

巴菲特和我成功可不是靠下賭注於預測總體經濟而成功的.

(61)”Well, the questioner came from Singapore which has perhaps the best economic record in the history of any developing economy and therefore he referred to 15% per annum as modest. It’s not modest–it’s arrogant. Only someone from Singapore would call it modest.”

只有新加坡提問的人認為15%的年增長率是保守的.

(62)”I don’t spend much time  regretting the past, once I’ve taken my lesson from it. I don’t dwell on it.”

我不花時間去緬懷過去,我已經從他那學到了東西,我不會沉溺於它

(63)”If you took our top fifteen decisions out, we’d have a pretty average record. It wasn’t hyperactivity, but a hell of a lot of patience. You stuck to your principles and when opportunities came along, you pounce on them with vigor.”

如果你拿掉前15個最好的投資決策,我們的紀錄就會跟一般人沒兩樣.你不需要過動是要耐心一些.你必須要堅持你的原則,當機會來時再出擊

(64)”We just throw some decisions into the ‘too hard’ file and go onto the others.”

我們把困難的決策丟掉,去做其他簡單的

(65)”Forgetting your mistakes is a terrible error if you are trying to improve your cognition.”

如果你要改善你的認知,忘記錯誤是可怕的

(66)”In the 1930s, there as a stretch here you could borrow more against the real estate than you could sell it for. I think that’s hat’s going on in today’s private-equity world”

在1930年代,你可以貸款超過你賣掉房子的錢.現在私募的世界就是如此

(67)”Mimicking the herd invites regression to the mean.”

模仿大家投資方式會讓投資回歸平均

(68)”A lot of opportunities in life tend to last a short while, due to some temporary inefficiency… For each of us, really good investment opportunities aren’t going to come along too often and won’t last too long, so you’ve got to be ready to act and have a prepared mind.”

很多投資機會都是短暫的,這是因為市場的沒效率....對我們來說,好的投資機會不會常來也不會持續太久,所以你必須準備好,在心智上也是

(69)”Everywhere there is a large commission, there is a high probability of a ripoff.”

有巨大傭金得地方很大的機率是騙局

(70)”Acknowledging what you don’t know is the dawning of wisdom.”

承認自己無知就是智慧的開端

(71)”Recognize reality even when you don’t like it – especially when you don’t like it.”

了解事實,既使你不喜歡它

(72)”We try more to profit from always remembering the obvious than from grasping the esoteric.”

我們獲利是靠迎顯得道理而不是抓住尖端困難的東西

(73) “Over the long term, it’s hard for a stock to earn a much better return that the business which underlies it earns. If the business earns six percent on capital over forty years and you hold it for that forty years, you’re not going to make much different than a six percent return – even if you originally buy it at a huge discount. Conversely, if a business earns eighteen percent on capital over twenty or thirty years, even if you pay an expensive looking price, you’ll end up with one hell of a result.”

長期來說,股價獲利通常與企業盈餘亦步亦趨.如果獲利以40年6%來成長,你最多也是獲得6%報酬 -- 不論你買的多低價.反之,當你買下30年以18％成長的公司,既使你買貴了,你最後還是會大賺..

(74)”Just as a man working with his tools should know its limitations, a man working with his cognitive apparatus must know its limitations.”

就如同一個人使用工具要知道工具的極限 -- 人在認知方面也是要如此

(75)”Many markets get down to two or three big competitors—or five or six. And in some of those markets, nobody makes any money to speak of. But in others, everybody does very well.  Over the years, we’ve tried to figure out why the competition in some markets gets sort of rational from the investor’s point of view so that the shareholders do well, and in other markets, there’s destructive competition that destroys shareholder wealth.  If it’s a pure commodity like airline seats, you can understand why no one makes any money. As we sit here, just think of what airlines have given to the world—safe travel, greater experience, time with your loved ones, you name it. Yet, the net amount of money that’s been made by the shareholders of airlines since Kitty Hawk, is now a negative figure—a substantial negative figure. Competition was so intense that, once it was unleashed by deregulation, it ravaged shareholder wealth in the airline business.  Yet, in other fields—like cereals, for example—almost all the big boys make out. If you’re some kind of a medium grade cereal maker, you might make 15% on your capital. And if you’re really good, you might make 40%. But why are cereals so profitable—despite the fact that it looks to me like they’re competing like crazy with promotions, coupons and everything else? I don’t fully understand it.  Obviously, there’s a brand identity factor in cereals that doesn’t exist in airlines. That must be the main factor that accounts for it.And maybe the cereal makers by and large have learned to be less crazy about fighting for market share—because if you get even one person who’s hell-bent on gaining market share…. For example, if I were Kellogg and I decided that I had to have 60% of the market, I think I could take most of the profit out of cereals. I’d ruin Kellogg in the process. But I think I could do it.”
“You must have the confidence to override people with more credentials than you whose cognition is impaired by incentive-caused bias or some similar psychological force that is obviously present. But there are also cases where you have to recognize that you have no wisdom to add – and that your best course is to trust some expert.”

很多市場最終都會剩下2-3個競爭者 -- 或是5-6個.這些市場中沒人因此而獲利.但在其他市場卻不是如此.這些年來,我們試著去思考為何這些競爭者如此理性,以至於給ˋ投資人不錯的報酬,但其他則是競爭激烈,給投資人帶來了負面的報酬.例如向航空業,就沒蝦咪人賺到錢.航空業帶給人安全的旅程,美好的經驗,省時.但目前,自萊特兄弟以來為股東帶來的報酬是負的 -- 而且是負的很多.一旦放鬆了監管,競爭就加劇,讓股東的報酬減少 .在其他領域 -- 如麥片,幾乎大的廠商都能賺錢,如果你是中型廠商,你可以賺15%報酬,如果你夠好,你可以賺40%.為何麥片如此賺錢 -- 無論是他們也是相當的競爭,常常辦些特價,優惠等等...我不是很能理解這件事, 明顯的是這可能是品牌的關係,也許也是麥片商已經學習到不要瘋狂的廠市占率....例如如果我是家樂氏,我決心擁有60%市占率,這我一定做得到,但這會毀了家樂氏.
你必須有自信去駕馭這些人,因為這些人的認知被激勵引起的偏見蒙蔽了或是其他如心理壓力.但是,你也不須理解到你不是特別聰明 -- 最好相信專家.

(76)”In business we often find that the winning system goes almost ridiculously far in maximizing and or minimizing one or a few variables — like the discount warehouses of Costco.”

在商業中,贏家的系統幾乎是誇張多的簡單化或是複雜化變數 -- 例如Costco的折價的商店

(77)”There are worse situations than drowning in cash and sitting, sitting, sitting. I remember when I wasn’t awash in cash — and I don’t want to go back.”

有些狀況比擁有很多現金沒事做更糟糕,我記得我資金拮据時 -- 我可不想回到當時

(78)”If you always tell people why, they’ll understand it better, they’ll consider it more important, and they’ll be more likely to comply.”

如果你告訴人為何要如此,它們會更加理解,理解這的重要性並切執行它

(79)”Spend less than you make; always be saving something. Put it into a tax-deferred account. Over time, it will begin to amount to something. This is such a no-brainer.”

花的比賺的少,存錢,把錢放在可以延遲繳稅的工具上,你就會慢慢有一筆錢,這不用任何大腦都可以做到

(80)”I try to get rid of people who always confidently answer questions about which they don’t have any real knowledge.”

我儘量遠離那些裝懂的人

(81)”I believe in the discipline of mastering the best that other people have ever figured out. I don’t believe in just sitting down and trying to dream it all up yourself. Nobody’s that smart…”

我深信學習那些前人智慧的做法是聰明的,我不相信閉門造車可以有所為,可沒人這樣聰明

(82)”I know someone who lives next door to what you would actually call a fairly modest house that just sold for $17 million. There are some very extreme housing price bubbles going on .”

我知道住我附近的一個傢伙,他那普通的房子竟然可以賣1700萬,這一定有房屋泡沫準備發生

(83)”Experience tends to confirm a long-held notion that being prepared, on a few occasions in a lifetime, to act promptly in scale, in doing some simple and logical thing, will often dramatically improve the financial results of that lifetime. A few major opportunities, clearly recognizable as such, will usually come to one who continuously searches and waits, with a curious mind that loves diagnosis involving multiple variables. And then all that is required is a willingness to bet heavily when the odds are extremely favorable, using resources available as a result of prudence and patience in the past.”

經驗告訴我們,當你把握少數的機會,而且常常做些簡單而具有邏輯性的事,你就可以累積財富.這些少數機會可以經由不斷的搜尋與等待中尋找,擁有好奇心與樂於多變數的分析有可以辦到.這些都是你擁有耐心,當機會來時就賭大的

(84)”The present era has no comparable referent in the past history of capitalism. We have a higher percentage of the intelligentsia engaged in buying and selling pieces of paper and promoting trading activity than in any past era. A lot of what I see now reminds me of Sodom and Gomorrah. You get activity feeding on itself, envy and imitation. It has happened in the past that there came bad consequences.”

現在這時代的資本主義可是跟以往不同的.很多聰明人都來股票市場攪和.這讓我想起了Sodom and Gomorrah.自我,忌妒,模仿.這會招來後果

(85)”Our investment style has been given a name – focus investing – which implies ten holdings, not one hundred or four hundred. The idea that it is hard to find good investments, so concentrate in a few, seems to me to be an obvious idea. But 98% of the investment world does not think this way. It’s been good for us.”

我們的投資風格就是聚焦,也就是持有10家股票,而不是100或是400家,好投資想法很少,所以我們更聚焦.但在投資領域的98%投資人可不這樣想.這對我們是助益

(86)”You want to be very careful with intense ideology. It presents a big danger for the only mind you’re ever going to get.”

你必須要注意擁有強烈意識形態,對心智來說擁有它是危險的

(87)”Like Warren, I had a considerable passion to get rich. “Not because I wanted Ferraris– I wanted the independence. I desperately wanted it.”

巴菲特跟我要變得富有的原因不是因為我們要法拉利跑車,而是獨立 --我極度渴望

(88)”Anyone with an engineering frame of mind will look at [accounting standards] and want to throw up.”

每個有工程師思維的人看到會計原則都想吐

(90)”It’s a good habit to trumpet your failures and be quiet about your successes.”

多談談錯誤的經驗比談談成功的過去更有價值

(91)”In effect about half our spare cash was stashed in currencies other than the dollar. I consider that a non-event. As it happens it’s been a very profitable non-event.”

我們一半的閒錢是放在非美元貨幣,沒想到這還讓我獲利

(92)”As for what we like least, we don’t want kleptocracies. We need a rule of law. If people are stealing from the companies, we don’t need that.”

我們不需要海盜.我們需要的是法律.如果人們都從公司裡偷東西.我們就不需要它

(93)”I agree with Peter Drucker that the culture and legal systems of the United States are especially favorable to shareholder interests, compared to other interests and compared to most other countries. Indeed, there are many other countries where any good going to public shareholders has a very low priority and almost every other constituency stands higher in line.”

我同意彼得杜拉克,美國的文化與系統是對股東友善的,相較於其他國家對股東沒有優先權好得多

(94)”Berkshire in its history has made money betting on sure things.”

波克夏賺錢的歷史就是在賭"確定的事"

(95)”I don’t think there’s any business that we’ve bought that would have sold itself to a hedge fund. There’s a class of businesses that doesn’t want to deal with private-equity and hedge funds…thank God”

我不認為我們買過的公司願把它賣給對沖基金或是私募基金 ..感謝老天

(96)”We’re guessing at our future opportunity cost. Warren is guessing that he’ll have the opportunity to put capital out at high rates of return, so he’s not willing to put it out at less than 10% now. But if we knew interest rates would stay at 1%, we’d change. Our hurdles reflect our estimate of future opportunity costs.”

我們都在猜機會成本,巴菲特也在猜,他不願意把資金放在低於10%的報酬機會上,但如果利率一直都在1%,我們就會改變.

(97)”Our ideas are so simple that people keep asking us for mysteries when all we have are the most elementary ideas.”

我們的見解都很簡單,但很多人都問我們些神秘的問題

(98)”The idea of a margin of safety, a Graham precept, will never be obsolete. The idea of making the market your servant will never be obsolete. The idea of being objective and dispassionate will never be obsolete. So Graham had a lot of wonderful ideas.”

由Graham提出的安全邊際概念永不過時,投資不要受市場影響也不會過時,永遠保持客觀與理性也永遠不會過時,Graham提出非常多的好想法

(99)”Ben Graham could run his Geiger counter over this detritus from the collapse of the 1930s and find things selling below their working capital per share and so on….  But he was, by and large, operating when the world was in shell shock from the 1930s—which was the worst contraction in the English-speaking world in about 600 years. Wheat in Liverpool, I believe, got down to something like a 600-year low, adjusted for inflation. the classic Ben Graham concept is that gradually the world wised up and those real obvious bargains disappeared. You could run your Geiger counter over the rubble and it wouldn’t click. … Ben Graham followers responded by changing the calibration on their Geiger counters. In effect, they started defining a bargain in a different way. And they kept changing the definition so that they could keep doing what they’d always done. And it still worked pretty well.”

Graham在1930年代用他的探照燈從廢墟中找低於每股現金的公司,在1930年代世界是處於驚恐的,正經歷英文世界中600年最嚴重的通縮.利物浦的小麥跌到600年新低.graham的概念是世界會慢慢復甦,股價便宜貨會消失.....graham的追隨者於是改變方法,用不同的方式,到現在這方法還是蠻有用的

(100)”Warren and I don’t feel like we have any great advantage in the high-tech sector. In fact, we feel like we’re at a big disadvantage in trying to understand the nature of technical developments in software, computer chips or what have you. So we tend to avoid that stuff, based on our personal inadequacies. Again, that is a very, very powerful idea. Every person is going to have a circle of competence. And it’s going to be very hard to advance that circle. If I had to make my living as a musician…. I can’t even think of a level low enough to describe where I would be sorted out to if music were the measuring standard of the civilization.  So you have to figure out what your own aptitudes are. If you play games where other people have the aptitudes and you don’t, you’re going to lose. And that’s as close to certain as any prediction that you can make. You have to figure out where you’ve got an edge. And you’ve got to play within your own circle of competence.  If you want to be the best tennis player in the world, you may start out trying and soon find out that it’s hopeless—that other people blow right by you. However, if you want to become the best plumbing contractor in Bemidji, that is probably doable by two-thirds of you. It takes a will. It takes the intelligence. But after a while, you’d gradually know all about the plumbing business in Bemidji and master the art. That is an attainable objective, given enough discipline. And people who could never win a chess tournament or stand in center court in a respectable tennis tournament can rise quite high in life by slowly developing a circle of competence—which results partly from what they were born with and partly from what they slowly develop through work.”

巴菲特和我對高科技沒影任何優勢,如軟體,電腦晶片等等,基於我們的不足,我們盡量避免參入其中.每個人都要有自己的優勢圈,如果我要靠音樂賺錢...我可能辦法生存,你應該要想想你的性個適合發展蝦咪,如果你玩別人擅長的遊戲,你就會失敗.例如你想成為網球專家,但你很快就會這沒希望,因為其他人輕易可以擊敗你,但如果你知是要成為管線承包商,或許有2/3的人可以做到,你只要努力,漸漸理解這行業,精通這藝術,並且訓練自己,就會有不錯的成果.沒有贏過象棋比賽或是網球比賽的人也可以慢慢做好這些工作..

(101)”Beta and modern portfolio theory and the like – none of it makes any sense to me.”

貝塔和現代組合投資理論對我來說就是 -- 完全是亂來

(102)”Today, it seems to be regarded as the duty of CEOs to make the stock go up. This leads to all sorts of foolish behavior. We want to tell it like it is.”

CEO如果有責任讓股價往上,常常會發生有人幹蠢事,就讓股價自己運作ㄋ

(103)”Our standard prescription for the know-nothing investor with a long-term time horizon is a no-load index fund. I think that works better than relying on your stock broker. The people who are telling you to do something else are all being paid by commissions or fees. The result is that while index fund investing is becoming more and more popular, by and large it’s not the individual investors that are doing it. It’s the institutions.”

對那些不理解投資藝術的人投資指數型基金是一個良方,這會比你依賴股票經紀商更好,那些常常收傭金的人常常建議你買其他商品.結果是指護型基金更為蓬勃.但卻是機構投資人去購買的

(104)”closet indexing….you’re paying a manager a fortune and he has 85% of his assets invested parallel to the indexes. If you have such a system, you’re being played for a sucker.”

暗箱投資就是....你支付投資金經理一些錢,結果他把85%的錢拿去投資接近指數的標的,如果你是這樣投資,你就是被當笨蛋耍

(105)”Black-Scholes is a know-nothing system. If you know nothing about value — only price — then Black-Scholes is a pretty good guess at what a 90-day option might be worth. But the minute you get into longer periods of time, it’s crazy to get into Black-Scholes.”

Black-Scholes是一種白癡的模型,如果你對價值一無所知,只知道價格....這模型在猜90天的期權價值是有用的...但超越更多的時間以後,你用這model就太瘋狂了..

(107)”It’s hard to predict what will happen with two brands in a market.  Sometimes they will behave in a gentlemanly way, and sometimes they’ll pound each other.  I know of no way to predict whether they’ll compete moderately or to the death.  If you could figure it out, you could make a lot of money.”

要預測兩個品牌如何在市場競爭是困難的,他們有時相當的紳士,有時卻互相殺砍.我沒有方法可以預測它們會如何,如果你想到了,你就會賺到錢

(108)”We’ve really made the money out of high quality businesses. In some cases, we bought the whole business. And in some cases, we just bought a big block of stock. But when you analyze what happened, the big money’s been made in the high quality businesses. And most of the other people who’ve made a lot of money have done so in high quality businesses.”

我們賺的錢都是投資優質企業賺來的,有時我們會買下全公司,有時會買下一大部份股權.我看見其他人賺錢也是靠這樣的

(109)”A lot of share-buying, not bargain-seeking, is designed to prop stock prices up. Thirty to 40 years ago, it was very profitable to look at companies that were aggressively buying their own shares. They were motivated simply to buy below what it was worth.”

很多不是低價買回庫藏股只是為拉高股價.40年前,當一家公司在低於價值買回庫藏股時,如國果你去購買,你就會賺錢

(110)”There are two kinds of businesses: The first earns 12%, and you can take it out at the end of the year. The second earns 12%, but all the excess cash must be reinvested — there’s never any cash. It reminds me of the guy who looks at all of his equipment and says, “There’s all of my profit.” We hate that kind of business. “

有兩種賺法,一種是你賺了12%,你可以在年終拿走.另一種事也是賺12%,但是你必須從新再投資資本.....你沒辦法擁有現金,這提醒我有一個傢伙對著這些設備說:這就是我的獲利...我們討厭這種商業模式

(111)”There are actually businesses, that you will find a few times in a lifetime, where any manager could raise the return enormously just by raising prices—and yet they haven’t done it. So they have huge untapped pricing power that they’re not using. That is the ultimate no-brainer. … Disney found that it could raise those prices a lot and the attendance stayed right up.  So a lot of the great record of Eisner and Wells … came from just raising prices at Disneyland and Disneyworld and through video cassette sales of classic animated movies… At Berkshire Hathaway, Warren and I raised the prices of See’s Candy a little faster than others might have. And, of course, we invested in Coca-Cola—which had some untapped pricing power. And it also had brilliant management. So a Goizueta and Keough could do much more than raise prices. It was perfect.”

你偶爾可以發現那種事業,只要CEO將產品提價就可以獲得大的利潤...他們也許還沒做,這是尚未開發的.這當然無須動腦...迪士尼發現它可以提價,遊客還是絡繹不絕,所以Eisner and Wells 之所以做這樣好只是因為把Disneyland樂園和Disneyworld動畫提高價錢....在波克夏,我們也會提高See's Candy的價格,可口可樂也是這樣的情形,況且他還有優秀的經理Goizueta and Keough,它們可以更有時間去做其他的事,這還不錯..

(112)”At Berkshire Hathaway we do not like to compete against Chinese manufacturers.”

波克夏不喜歡跟中國的製造商競爭

(114)”We’re the tortoise that has outrun the hare because it chose the easy predictions.”

我們是跑贏烏龜的兔子,因為我們只做簡單的預測

(116)”Understanding both the power of compound return and the difficulty of getting it is the heart and soul of understanding a lot of things.”

了解複利的威力和困難度讓你更了解投資

(117)”Generally speaking, it can’t be good to be running a big current account deficit and a big fiscal deficit and have them both growing. You would be thinking the end there would be a comeuppance.” “[But] it isn’t as though all the other options look wonderful compared to the US. It gives me some feeling that what I regard as fiscal misbehavior on our part could go on some time without paying the price.”

嚴格來說,這不是好現象,當美國持續成長的出超與赤字,到最後這一定有報應的.但比起美國其他國家而言,這還好,短時間之內這問題不會出現問題

(119)”Almost all good businesses engage in ‘pain today, gain tomorrow’ activities.”

幾乎所有的好商業模式都是只要今天付出,明天就會有回報

(120)”No CEO examining books today understands what the hell is going on.”

沒有CEO可以看看財報就理解現在發生蝦咪事

(121)”Generally speaking, if you’re counting on outside directors to act [forcefully to protect your interests as a shareholder, then you’re crazy].  As a general rule in  America, boards act only if there’s been a severe disgrace. My friend Joe was asked to be on the board of Northwestern Bell and he jokes that ‘it was the last thing they ever asked me.’ I think you get better directors when you get directors who don’t need the money.  When it’s half your income and all your retirement, you’re not likely to be very independent.  But when you have money and an existing reputation that you don’t want to lose, then you’ll act more independently.”

如果你希望外部董事來保護股東權益,你一定是瘋了.在美國,董事會要有行動只有當事情鬧很大時才會動作,當你一半的收入或是退休金在那時,你就不可能獨立.但當你有錢又存在名聲時,你就不會想失去它,此時你就會更獨立..

(122)”If mutual fund directors are independent, then I’m the lead character in the Bolshoi Ballet.”

如果共同基金的董事可以獨立,那我就是 Bolshoi Ballet的主要舞者了

(123)”Of course I’m troubled by huge consumer debt levels – we’ve pushed consumer credit very hard in the US.  Eventually, if it keeps growing, it will stop growing. As Herb Stein said, “If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.”  When it stops, it may be unpleasant.  Other than Herb Stein’s quote, I have no comment.”

我對巨大的負債消費感到擔心....過去美國不遺餘力刺激消費但最後,成長勢必會趨緩,就如同Herb Stein所說的:如果他沒繼續就必定會終止,終止時勢必會感到相當的不適應

(124)” I think it would be a great improvement if there were no D&O insurance . The counter-argument is that no-one with any money would serve on a board. But I think net net you’d be better off.”

我認為沒有董監責任險是一種進步,反向的觀點也許會認為有錢人都不願意加入ㄋ,我認為這很好

(125)”We don’t care about quarterly earnings (though obviously we care about how the business is doing over time) and are unwilling to manipulate in any way to make some quarter look better.”

我們不關心季度盈餘,也不願意修改它讓它更好看些

(128)”We have a history when things are really horrible of wading in when no one else will.”

我們曾在沒人敢進場時進場買股票

(129)”We have monetized houses in this country in a way that’s never occurred before. Ask Joe how he bought a new Cadillac [and he’ll say] from borrowing on his house. We are awash in capital. [Being] awash is leading to very terrible behavior by credit cards and subprime lenders -a very dirty business, luring people into a disadvantageous position. It’s a new way of getting serfs, and it’s a dirty business. We have financial institutions, including those with big names, extending high-cost credit to the least able people. I find a lot of it  revolting because it’s a free market doesn’t mean it’s honorable.”

我們用房子抵押換成現金的方法之前從來沒發生過,問問Joe,你如何用抵押房子去買下凱迪拉克,我們處於資本過剩的年代,過剩造就可怕的行為,如刷爆信用卡跟底阿貸款證卷化 -- 一個骯髒的生意,吸引人去往不利於他的方向.這是一個讓人成為奴役的新方法.包括一些大的金融機構,貸給那些信用低的人,我覺得噁心,自由市場不意味這是光榮的

(132)”I know just enough about  thermodynamics to understand that if it takes too muchl  fossil- fuel to create ethanol, that’s a very stupid way to solve an energy problem.”

雖然我懂的熱力學不多,但如果我們花太多燃料去生產乙醇,這方法一定是笨

(133)”It is entirely possible that you could use our mental models to find good IPOs to buy.  There are countless IPOs every year, and I’m sure that there are a few cinches that you could jump on.  But the average person is going to get creamed.  So if you’re talented, good luck. IPOs are too small for us, or too high tech, so we won’t understand them.  So, if Warren’s looking at them, I don’t know about it.”

在新的IPO公司去投資是有可能的.裡面可能有幾家還不錯,大部分還是不行的.如果你願意花時間去研究,那就祝你好運搂,IPO對我們來說太小了,而且都是我們不懂的高科技,我們不會想去了解

(134)”Well envy/jealousy made, what, two out of the ten commandments? Those of you who have raised siblings you know about envy, or tried to run a law firm or investment bank or even a faculty? I’ve heard Warren say a half a dozen times, “It’s not greed that drives the world, but envy.”

羨慕跟忌妒佔了10誡中的兩個,如果你養過小孩,或是開一家投行,甚至是教職員,你就會理解,巴菲特說,世界會成長不是因為貪婪,而是忌妒..

(135)”Suppose, any one of you knew of a wonderful thing right now that you were  overwhelmingly  confident- and correctly so- would produce about 12% per annum compounded as far as you could see. Now, if you actually had that available, and by going into it you were forfeiting all opportunities to make money faster- there’re a lot of you who wouldn’t like that. But a lot of you would think, “What the hell do I care if somebody else makes money faster?” There’s always going to be somebody who is making money faster, running the mile faster or what have you. So in a human sense, once you get something that works fine in your life, the idea of caring terribly that somebody else is making money faster strikes me as insane.”

假設有一個確定性的12%年化報酬機會在.但你也要放棄這個機會去賺更快的錢,大部分的人是不願意的,部分的人也許會問:我幹蝦咪要在乎別人賺錢比我還快ㄋ??總是有人賺錢比你還快阿,跑的也比你快.一旦你做得很好而且賺了錢,為何還要在意別人賺得比你快ㄋ..

(138)”…in terms of which businesses succeed and which businesses fail, advantages of scale are ungodly important. …  In some businesses, the very nature of things is to sort of cascade toward the overwhelming dominance of one firm. And these advantages of scale are so great, for example, that when Jack Welch came into General Electric, he just said, “To hell with it. We’re either going to be # 1 or #2 in every field we’re in or we’re going to be out.”

規模有時對企業極為重要,這優勢極為明顯,例如GE的Jack Welch說的,要不是第1或是第2,剩下就出局

(139)”Obviously, consideration of costs is key, including opportunity costs. Of course capital isn’t free. It’s easy to figure out your cost of borrowing, but theorists went bonkers on the cost of equity capital. They say that if you’re generating a 100% return on capital, then you shouldn’t invest in something that generates an 80% return on capital. It’s crazy.”

明顯的,考慮成本是關鍵,包含機會成本,資金一般不是免費的,你可以輕鬆算出資金成本.但理論家會說:如果你擁有100%的資金報酬,你就不該投資80%的資金報酬機會...它們瘋了...

(167)”…by regularly reading business newspaper and magazines I am exposed to an enormous amount of material at the micro level..  I find that what I see going on there pretty much informs me about what’s happening at the macro level.”

我透過經常性的閱讀商業雜誌跟期刊來理解大量微觀經濟的東西.....我發現我也在看見正在發生巨觀的事件..

(170)”Size will hurt returns. Look at Berkshire Hathaway – the last five things Warren  has done have generated returns that are splendid by historical standards, but now give him $100 billion in assets and measure outcomes across all of it, it doesn’t look so good. We can only buy big positions, and the only time we can get big positions is during a horrible period of decline or stasis. That really doesn’t happen very often.”

管理的資產愈大,報酬會愈低,看看波克夏, -- 以歷史紀錄來看,巴菲特上5個投資還不錯,但如果給他1000億美金去投資,它就不會投資如此好,這時只能投資大的項目,通常這機會只有出現在總體經濟很差的時候,但這機會不多..

(176)”Civilized people don’t buy gold. They invest in productive businesses.”

文明人不買黃金,他們只投資生產的事業

REF:http://wealthymatters.com/2011/02/12/charlie-mungers-quotes-mungerisms/